CHINAR EXPORTS LTD Vs. OM PRAKASH SAHNI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Brief facts relevant for these appeals are that the respondent Mr. O. P. Sahni sent 700 shares to the appellant Company for transfer along with transfer deeds on 12.9.1994. The Company did not return the shares duly transferred to the (Complainant. Instead, on 5.6.1995 the Company informed the complainant that there was a dispute between the Company and its Registrar and the latter had withheld the entire records and' that a suit had been filed on the original side of Delhi High Court and interim directions were being obtained to process the case of transfer of shares.500 shares out of those sent by the complainant were transferred and sent to the complainant in October, 1995. The remaining shares were returned as being fictitious. The opposite party denied that the complainant was covered under the definition of "consumer" under the Act. It was further pleaded that the Company had a dispute with its Registrar and in the absence of the records which were withheld by the Registrars necessary action for transfer of the shares could not be taken. The District Forum held that the complainant was covered under the definition of "consumer". The reason why shares were not transferred and returned to the complainant within the statutory period of two months was held to constitute deficiency in service. Against the claim of Rs.50,000/- made by the complainant, the District Forum allowed compensation amounting to Rs.5,000/- including costs of the proceedings. Aggrieved by the order, the Company arrayed as opposite party in the complaint has preferred this appeal. The respondent has filed cross appeal seeking enhancement of compensation. None appeared for the appellant when the appeal was called on for hearing. We have heard Mr. O. P. Sahni, respondent and have carefully gone through the records.

(2.) The first question to be decided is regarding limitation. Order of the District Forum is dated 13.1.1997. It has been admitted by the appellant that certified copy of the order was received in the office of the appellant on 31.1.1997. The present appeal was filed on 10.4.1997. Application for condonation of delay has been filed along with the appeal. In the application for condonation of delay it has been stated that the dealing official in the office of the appellant proceeded on leave without informing the other concerned persons about the receipt of the impugned order. The other official. who attended to the duties of the one, who had proceeded on leave being not a legally trained person was not aware about the significance of limitation. The official, who had proceeded on leave, resumed duty and put-up the papers to the senior officials, who became aware of the order on 25.2.1997. He obtained decision of the Director, who was out of station on tour and returned to Delhi only on 2nd March, 1997. The Director discussed the matter with the Advocate and decided to file an appeal on 14th March, 1997. The Advocate was asked to prepare application for condonation of delay and this is the explanation rendered for not filing the appeal in time. The affidavit of the Director of the Company in the nature of verifying the facts stated in the application generally has been filed. The delay required to be condoned is of 39 days. We find that the grounds disclosed in the application do not make out sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The period of 30 days for preferring an appeal from the date of receipt of certified copy is meant to complete the exercise and the appellant is expected to make necessary arrangements for contingencies such as where a certain official proceeds on leave so that necessary action is taken in time. A careful reading of the application shows that the appellant had not been prosecuting the matter with the diligence so as to file the appeal within limitation. We do not find that sufficient cause has been made out. We, accordingly, reject the application. As a result, the appeal fails on the short ground of limitation.

(3.) Assuming for the sake of argument that the delay had been condoned, we proceed to deal with the appeal on merits. The first objection mentioned in the grounds of appeal is that the complainant-respondent in the appeal was not covered under the definition of 'consumer'. In support of this contention, reference has been made to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund V/s. Kartick Das, 1994 2 CPJ 7 SC. We find no merit in this contention. In Morgan Stanley the Supreme Court was dealing with a case where a person had applied for allotment of shares. It was laid down by the Apex Court that the applicant was a prospective investor and did not fall within the ambit of the word 'consumer' as defined in the Act. The case of the respondent in the present appeal, on the other hand, is clearly distinguishable. He had purchased a certain number of shares from the secondary market. In law, he had acquired right and title to the shares and being beneficiary was entitled to request the Company to transfer the shares in his name on the basis of the transfer deeds duly executed by the holder of the shares. Unless the right of the transferee to have the share transferred in his or her name is taken to inhere in the case of a transfer the shares would cease to be tradable. The case of the respondent was, therefore, clearly distinguishable, and he was covered under the definition of 'consumer'.