RAVINDER SINGH Vs. MAHARISHI DAYANAND UNIVERSITY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) 1. As per majority We do not find any illegality or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the State Commission. Hence, this Revision Petition is dismissed.

(2.) Minority view, I do not agree with above order.

(3.) In my dissenting order in Chairman, Board of Examinations, Madras v. Mohldeen Abdul Kader, (Revision Petition No. 545 of 1994) I have observed that education is a composite activity consisting of several components such as admission to educational institutions, teaching and instruction, holding of examinations, evaluation of performance of students in the courses they have undergone, declaration of results, issuance of certificates/diplomas of achievements and mark-sheets etc. which require payment of prescribed fees (consideration) by the candidates/students to the designated educational institutions unless specified as 'free' and that therefore the issue whether any component is a service under the Consumer Protection Act, cannot be delinked from the broader issue whether education is a service under the Consumer Protection Act and also that these two issues should be examined in an integrated way. I have also pointed out in the abovesaid case that so far the National Commission has not made such an integrated analysis of these inseparable set of issues. I have argued there that the definition of 'Consumer', 'service' and 'deficiency' in the Consumer Protection Act has wide scopes of interpretation and that the words "any service for a consideration" in the definition of consumer in the Act point to the generally non-restrictive nature of the said definition in relation to service. Similarly, the words 'avails of" in Section 2(l)(d)(ii) as alternative to 'hires' in the same section as also the words "has been undertaken to be performed in pursuance of a contract or otherwise in relation to any service" in Section 2(1)(g) have the effect of bringing under the purview of the Consumer Forum, services rendered by bodies like Universities which are established for rendering specified services and which services are availed of for a consideration, even in the absence of any contract per se to hire such services. In this connection, I have also drawn on the observations of the Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, 1986-95 Consumer 278 (NC) and in Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha & Ors., 1986-95 SCC Suppl. 1569 (NS) After pointing out that the definition of 'Service' in the Consumer Protection Act is in three parts, the Supreme Court observed in the former case.