G C BATALIA Vs. CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL FORUM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question raised is whether the services rendered by Pathologist will be covered by the definition of service given in Sec.2 (1) (o) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter the said Act for short) so as to bring a case of compensation filed by respondent No.2 on grounds of professional negligence and lack of post operative care within the jurisdiction of respondent No.1.

(2.) Respondent No.2 was operated for cataract in his left eye by the petitioner on 8.12.1989. On 14.12.1989 he was discharged from petitioner's hospital. It appears that respondent No.2 developed complications in his operated eye and on petitioner's reference visited Shankar Netralaya, Madras. However, the subsequent efforts proved in vain and he lost vision of his left eye. He presented a complaint for compensation before the State Forum respondent No.1 In this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the petitioner challenges jurisdiction of respondent No.1 to entertain the said petition.

(3.) The argument of petitioner's learned Counsel is that the services rendered by a professional like the petitioner are not governed within Sec.2 (1) (o) of the said Act as the services enumerated therein indicate that professional services were not intended to be included in the said definition. Elaborating further he referred to the dictionary meaning of professional and the objects and reasons of the said Act. The submission is that the aforesaid definition in the light of objects and reasons for the said Act cannot be construed to include the professional services rendered by a medical expert. In reply, Shri Sanyal, the learned Counsel for respondent No.2, cited B. Shekhar Hegde V/s. Dr. Sudhanshu Bhattacharya and Another, 1992 2 CPJ 449, wherein the State Forum Bombay has held thus : "section 2 (1) (o) of the Act defines 'service', which is an inclusive definition. Such inclusive definitions are very generally used to enlarge the meaning of words or a phrase/s occurring in the body of the Statute, and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause declares they shall include. It, therefore, implies that the definition of "service" occurring in C. P. Act includes the services rendered by private Medical Practitioners and Private Nursing Homes and Hospitals provided it is not a free service. " Another decision relied upon by him is M/s. Cosmopolitan Hospitals and Another V/s. Vasantha P. Nair, 1992 1 CPJ 302, wherein the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi held: "it is a well established principle of statutory construction that where the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, they have to be given their full effect and their ambit cannot be cut down by reference to the preamble to the Act, the statements of objects and reasons appended to the Bill or to the debates and speeches on the floor of the Legislature/parliament. The expression 'service' has been defined in Sec.2 (1) (o) of the Act as meaning "service of any description" which is made available to potential users. The only two categories of service exempted from the purview of the Act under the said definition are "service rendered free of charge" or "under a contract of personal service". When Parliament has unambiguously defined the expression "service" in such broad language giving it the widest amplitude, we see absolutely no warrant for cutting down and restricting the scope of the definition to only service relating to "commercial transactions" That such a restriction was not intended by the Parliament becomes clear when we turn to the inclusive part of the said definition where facilities in connection with 'insurance' and 'purveying of news or other information' are specifically enumerated as falling within its scope. Life Insurance is basically a welfare measure for ensuring social security and it would not be right to regard it as a purely 'commercial transaction'. So too, the purveying of news or other information need not always partake of a commercial character. Even apart from this, going by the language used by Parliament, service of any kind which is made available to potential users for consideration falls within the scope of the definition unless it is covered by either of the two exempted categories aforementioned. Hence, we see no substance in the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants and the interveners that service rendered by hospitals and members of medical profession for consideration will not constitute 'service' as defined in the Act because it does not relate to a 'commercial transaction'. " We find no infirmity whatsoever in the aforesaid finding of the National Commission which appears to be a complete answer to the arguments of petitioner's learned Counsel.