STATE BANK OF INDIA Vs. SUKHBIR SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This revision petition has been filed under Sec. 58 (1) (b) of the Act 2019 in challenge to the Order dtd. 11/4/2022 of the State Commission in I.A. No. 705 of 2021 in First Appeal No. 296 of 2013 arising out of the Order dtd. 28/1/2013 of the District Commission in complaint no. 238 of 2008.

(2.) Petition has been filed with a delay of 380 days. The application seeking condonation of delay has also been filed along with this Petition. Hence, the counsel has been heard firstly on the application seeking condonation of delay in order to see whether the same deserves to be allowed or not.

(3.) Submission of the learned counsel is that the Petitioner had been pursuing this matter with sincerity and has not shown any negligence in the mater and had also pursued the same in right earnest. It is pointed out that at some stage during the pendency of the Appeal before the State Commission, the matter was not listed for a long period of time and as such an interlocutory application being I.A. No. 705 of 2021 was moved on behalf of the Petitioner to fix some date in the appeal. That I.A. was allowed and the Registry of the State Commission was directed that the next date of hearing in the Appeal may be intimated to the Petitioner / Appellant. Submission is that inadvertently the next date of hearing was wrongly noted on behalf of the Petitioner / Appellant and therefore, appearance could not be duly made on the date fixed. Further submission is that Clerk of the representing Advocate kept visiting in the State Commission from time to time to know the correct date but correct information regarding the next date of hearing in the matter was not supplied to him. Submission is that actually it was only on 6/4/2023, when the Respondent visited the Petitioner's Branch, it gave letter dtd. 6/4/2023 along with copy of the impugned order dtd. 11/4/2022 passed by the State Commission and also the copy of the Order dtd. 6/2/2013 passed by the District Commission. It was only after going through the aforesaid Order of dismissal of the Appeal that the Petitioner / Appellant could acquire the knowledge of the impugned Order. Contention is that the period of limitation ought to be counted from the date of such knowledge and all the period that lapsed after passing of the impugned Order till the date of acquiring such knowledge should not be reckoned with while counting the period of limitation.