MAHENDRA THAKUR Vs. DEVENDRA KOTHARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Register the appeal as defective. Office reported that this appeal has been presented after 472 days of the expiry of the period of limitation. An application for condonation of delay was submitted. The application has been duly verified on oath. It has been stated that the appellant came to know about the impugned order which was passed on 31.7.1989 on 21.8.1990, when kurki warrant for Rs.500/- was presented to him which was bearing the name of M/s. Sawadha Electronics and Vision Service, whereas there is no concern of this name at Jalore. Further that he immediately went to the office of the District Forum and submitted an application for quashing the order dated 31.7.1990 but no order was passed till 8.12.1990 on the application of the appellants. It has prayed that in these circumstances delay for filing the appeal against the impugned order may be condoned. We have carefully considered the application. The words "sufficient cause" and "satisfied" used in proviso to Sec.15 are in pari materia with the words used in Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and its predecessor statute of 1908. Sec.5 of the Limitation Act was considered in AIR 1962 SC 36 wherein it was observed : ". . . The context seems to suggest that "within such period" means within the period which ends with the last date of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases falling under S.5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. . . " later on in AIR 1977 SC 2221 it was held by the Supreme Court as under : "section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large majority of case-law has grown around S.5 its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accused to a part by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every day's delay. . . "

(2.) In view of these principles, the appellant is required to explain delay beyond the terminus line of the prescribed period of limitation and further that he has acted diligently for the purpose of filing the appeal. It is settled that if anything is not done with due care and attention, it cannot be said to have been done diligently. The impugned order was passed on 31.7.1989. Whereas in the application the date mentioned of the impugned order is 31.7.1990. At that time the appeal has become time barred though in the application the date mentioned of the impugned order 31.7.1990. He submitted an application for quashing the order before the District Forum. No date has been mentioned as to when that application was submitted. The application for quashing that order has not been decided by the District Forum as yet. The appeal was filed here on 15.12.1990 which has been reported to be barred by 472 days. The application is vague. The applicant has not succeeded in explaining the delay of 472 days.

(3.) Having carefully considered the application for condonation of delay, verified on oath we are of opinion that the appellant has miserably failed to substantiate his case for presenting the appeal 472 days after the expiry of period of limitation.