(1.) This is an application for condonation of sizeable delay in preferring the appeal. The order of the District Forum under challenge was recorded way back on the 18th of September, 1991. The appeal was however, preferred as date as 29th of November, 1991 plainly far beyond the prescribed period of 30 days under Sec.15 of the Consumer Protection Act.
(2.) Learned Counsel for the applicant had first attempted to contend that the period of limitation should be computed from the 30th of September, 1991 when a copy of the order under appeal was allegedly received in the office of the appellant company. This submission has only to be noticed and rejected. It is well settled in this jurisdiction since a considerable time by the exhaustive order of the State Commission in First Appeal No.16 of 1990 haryana State Electricity Board V/s. Dinesh Kumar, 1992 1 CPJ 359 decided on 4th February, 1991 that the terminus for computing the period of limitation runs from the date of the order and not from any supposedly slippery date of the alleged receipt of a copy thereof. In view of this authoritative pronouncement the delay in filing the appeal has to be viewed from the recording of the order and thus works out to 42 days beyond the prescribed period.
(3.) What next deserve highlighting is the fact that even placing the case of the applicant on the highest and computing the period from the 30th of September, 1991 the present appeal is still being filed far beyond the limitation period of 30 days. The only extenuation suggested for this gross laches on behalf of the applicant is that 10 days after the receipt of the copy of the order an application was sought to be moved before the District Forum on the 10th of October, 1991 seeking a review of the judgment and rehearing of the whole case. When pointedly asked the learned Counsel for the appellant-applicant could point out no provision, nor cite any chapter or verse which warranted the making of such an application. Obviously once the order has been pronounced the same could be impugned only by way of an appeal under Sec.15. The misguided filing of an application not warranted by any provision of law and principle can thus hardly be any legal ground or sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal against the order within limitation.