MADHU ARORA Vs. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MR . Madan submits that Bank is the only necessary party for the purposes of this appeal and the presence of respondent Nos. 2 and 3 who are the principal borrowers/mortgagors is not necessary, although notices were sent to them by Registered Post as well as through Courier and the same were received by Mr. Sunil Chaudhary, the husband of Smt. Anju Chaudhary, respondent No. 3, who is one of the Directors of respondent No. 2. Service of notice upon respondent Nos. 2 and 3 is, therefore, held sufficient. Heard parties Counsel on these appeals which have been directed against a common order dated 14.1.2013 passed in S.A. (Dy. No. 2/2013), Madhu Arora v. Punjab National Bank and S.A. (Dy. No. 3/2013) -Usha Kumari v. Punjab National Bank, by the DRT -I, Delhi whereby after hearing the parties on interim relief, the Tribunal below has dismissed both the S.As. as barred by limitation.

(2.) THE record shows that the said S.As. were filed by the appellants challenging the possession notice dated 29.10.2012 issued by the respondent Bank qua their respective flats on the first and second floors, in the front portion of property bearing No. F -130 -A, Gautam Nagar, New Delhi and seeking interim relief of restraining the Bank from taking possession or further action under the SARFAESI Act in respect of the said flats. While hearing the parties on the interim relief, the maintainability of the said S.As. was challenged by the respondent Bank on the ground of being barred by limitation. The learned Tribunal below, without entering into the merit of the matter, while holding that the appellants had not shown any justified reason for condoning the delay and relying upon the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Govindrao Thaware v. Central Bank of India, has dismissed the S.As. by the order impugned on the ground of limitation.

(3.) THE Gujarat High Court taking a similar view in Union Bank of India v. Chairperson, The Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal & Ors., : II(2011) SLT 790 : AIR 2010 Guj. 63, has held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply to the discretion to be exercised by the Tribunal below for the entertainment of the appeal after the period of 45 days after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances on the aspect of sufficiency of cause to condone the delay.