(1.) This petition for leave to appeal is against judgment and order dated 3-5-1998 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court Division in Writ Petition No-1419 of 1990 discharging the Rule Nisi.
(2.) The short fact required for the disposal of this matter is that, respondent No. 1 was appointed a Production Manager of the petitioner-company who joined the company as such on 3-11-1994 and his case is that though his designation was Production Manager but he was not given any managerial or supervisory responsibilities and his duty was confined to physical and manual kind of works. It is his further case that he was forced to go on leave on 10-6-1985 which was extended upto 23- 6-1985 and while on leave he was served with a notice to show cause by the petitioner-company on 16-6-1985 on various charges and when the reply was submitted he was allowed to resume his duties on 7-7-1985. This respondent worked for the months of October and November, 1985 but was given pay of 1/2 of the month of October. He then demanded his full pay for the aforesaid two months and on being furious the petitioner obstructed the respondent in his duties with effect from 1-12-1985 though he reported for duty on every day. Thereafter respondent No.1 filed IRO case No. 2 of 1986 in the Third Labour Court of Dhaka for directing the petitioner to allow him to resume his duties and pay his arrear salary as admissible.
(3.) Entering Caveat the learned Advocate for respondent No.1 submits that mere assertion that respondent No. 1 is not a Labourer but an officer working in the management cannot be a ground for rejection of the IRO case as onus lies heavily in the petitioner to prove that which they failed before the Labour Court. They even failed to produce any paper before the High Court Division in support of their contention. In support of his submission the learned Advocate placed reliance on the case of Senior Manager; Dosta Textile Mills Ltd. Ranirhat, Feni and ors vs. Sudhansu Bikash Nath reported in 40 DLR (AD) 45. It has been held in this decision that mere designation is not sufficient to indicate whether a person is a worker or an employer, but it is the nature of the work showing extent of his authority which determines whether he is a worker or employer.