BEGUM SHAMSUNNAHAR Vs. GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 28-1-2001 passed by the Administrative Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 127 of 1999 allowing the appeal by majority view.

(2.) Short facts are that the appellant while working as Project Director of Rural Women Employment Creation Project, the Bureau of Anti-Corruption on 16-11-1994 lodged an FIR with the Ramna Police Station on the allegations of offence punishable under sections 406/409/109 of the Penal Code read with section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 against her. She surrendered before the Court on 20-11-1994 and was enlarged on bail. The respondent No.2, a Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, then by his impugned memo dated 19-12-1994 discharged her from service. She then preferred Writ Petition No. 2602 of 1994 against the above order of her discharge from service but the writ petition was rejected on 5-1-1995 with observation that she should seek redress before the competent Administrative Tribunal. In the meantime she preferred an appeal on 7-1-1995 to the Secretary, Ministry of Women and Children Affairs against the impugned order of discharge from service. Thereafter, on 23-2-1995, she instituted Administrative Tribunal Case No. 34 of 1995 before the Administrative Tribunal, Dhaka which was rejected on 22-4-1995 as being not maintainable since no decision of the Secretary, Ministry of Women and Children Affairs was annexed. She preferred Administrative Appellate Tribunal Appeal No. 73 of 1995 before the Administrative Appellate Tribunal challenging the order of rejection but the same was also rejected on 1-3-1997. Thereafter, she received memo No.

(3.) The learned Member of the Administrative Tribunal by his judgment and order dated 27-5-1999 allowed the case holding that the discharge of the appellant from service by respondent No. 2, a Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs, was illegal on account of the President being her appointing authority. It was further held that the impugned order was against the principle of natural justice and in violation of Article 135(1) of the Constitution. The respondent then filed appeal before the Administrative Appellate Tribunal being Appeal No. 127 of 1999 and the Administrative Appellate Tribunal by the impugned judgment and order allowed the appeal by majority view as aforesaid.