DR M A MAZED Vs. GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by leave is against the judgment and order dated August 14, 2001 of a Division Bench of the High Court Division in Criminal Rule No. 88(R) of 2001 (arising from Government Appeal No. 8 of 2001). The High Court Division by the aforesaid judgment condoned the delay of 150 days (in the application for condonation of delay 163 days was mentioned) in filing the appeal against the judgment and order dated June 29, 2000 of the 1st Court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Gazipur, passed in Sessions Case No. 27 of 2000 (corresponding GR Case No. 670 of 1998. Joydebpur PS Case No. 8(9) of 1998). The learned Assistant Session Judge by the said judgment acquitted the appellants of the charges under sections 143, 448, 427, 342, 386 and 380 of the Penal Code. The Government as against the order of acquittal has filed Government Appeal No. 8 of 2001. The appeal so filed being out of time by 150 days filed an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay of the said days and thereupon Rule, Criminal Rule No. 88(R) of 2001 was issued.

(2.) The appellants entered appearance in the Rule and opposed the prayer for condonation of delay. The High Court Division condoned the delay upon observing that the ground of delay cannot be characterized "to be loose and the application cannot be axed down. The delay of 150 days on the part of the Government who remains a slow moving juristic person, thus, demands due consideration and the delay caused may be condoned to secure ends of justice".

(3.) As against the judgment and order of the High Court Division appellants filed a petition seeking leave to appeal contending that in view of the provision of section 417(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr. P. C. though Government present an appeal to the High Court Division from an original order of acquittal passed by any Court of Session but under sub-section 3 thereof no appeal from an order of acquittal is entertainable by the High Court Division after expiry of 60 days from the date of an order of acquittal and the special limitation under section 417(3) of the Cr. P. C. "left no scope for application of section 5 of the Limitation Act inasmuch as there being no cogent reason explaining the delay, there is no scope in law to condone the delay to secure ends of justice". The further contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants was that delay was not explained upon stating cogent reason for the same.