(1.) HEARD learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and learned Counsel appearing for the CBI on the matter of bail.
(2.) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellant being one of the partners of M/s. Chhotanagpur Cattle Feed and Supply Company as well as other partners of the said company though has been convicted under Section 120B read with Section 420/409/467/68/471/477A of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 13(2) read with 13(1), 13(c)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and has awarded maximum sentence for some of the offences for six years on the allegation that the company without supplying the material took payment of huge amount but there has been absolutely no evidence to the effect that the appellant was responsible for day -to -day affairs of the company, rather as per the case of the prosecution itself, it was Md. Sayeed who was looking after the affairs of the company and the appellant has been convicted and sentenced by taking aid of Section 25 of the Partnership Act, though under that provision one partner could not be held responsible for any criminal act done by the other partner and, therefore, the Court below committed illegality in passing the order of conviction and taking into consideration all these aspects of the matter, other partners have been admitted to bail and this appellant was admitted to bail in other fodder scam cases. Learned Counsel further submits that M/s. Chhotanagpur Cattle Feed and Supply Company does have two accounts, one as partnership firm and the other as proprietary firm and moreover deposits concerning payment relating to this case were made in the accounts of the partnership firm to which the appellant had no concern as per the statement made by Md. Sayeed though some deposits through pay -in -slips are said to have been made by the appellant but those deposits were never made in the accounts of partnership firm and, therefore, the appellant can be said to be quite innocen.
(3.) REGARD being had to the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the allegation levelled against the appellant, I am not inclined to grant bail to the appellant. Hence, the prayer for bail of the appellant is rejected. However, the appellant would be at liberty to move for bail after serving half of the period of the maximum sentence imposed by the trial Court if the appeal is not taken up for hearing before that. The aforesaid I.A. stands disposed.