(1.) The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 06.01.2006, passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dhanbad in M.J Case No. 2 of 1990, whereby the application of the respondents under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has been allowed with a direction to the petitioner to make payment of due amount to the concerned workmen(respondents herein) on account of difference of wages arising out of payment of one and half times the daily wages and double wages claimed as per Joshi Agreement and National Coal Wage Agreement (in short to be referred as N.C.W.A.) respectively.
(2.) The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the respondents were the security guards in the Jamadoba Colliery of the petitioner and they had filed a petition under section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short Act, 1947) before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dhanbad being M.J Case No. 2 of 1990 claiming that they have been paid only half days additional wages for working on Sundays and other rest days during the period the Joshi Agreement was effective, whereas, they were entitled to one and half days wages. They had further claimed that after coming into force of NCWA-II, w.e.f. 01.01.1979, the respondents were entitled to double wages for the Sundays or other rest days, however they had been paid only one day wages which is inconsistent with the relevant provisions. The petitioner appeared before the Labour Court and challenged the petition of the respondents on the ground of maintainability as well as delay and latches in filing the claim petition. The learned Labour Court passed an order dated 06.01.2006 allowing the claim of the respondents with a direction to the management to pay the outstanding dues to the respondents as has been determined in the impugned order itself.
(3.) The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner while assailing the impugned order submits that the learned Labour Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947 has arbitrarily adjudicated the dispute without any jurisdiction under the said provisions. It is further submitted that the learned Labour Court while passing the impugned award has not appreciated the scope of section 33-C(2) of the Act, 1947. It is also submitted that it is a settled law that under section 33-C(2) of the Act, the court has to exercise its jurisdiction as an executing court and there cannot be a full-fledged adjudication of the dispute under the said proceeding. In support of the above contention, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner put reliance on the following judgments:-