SUKUMAR NATH JHA Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER LABOUR COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal under section 10 of the Letters Patent, is directed against the judgment and order passed in CWJC No. 1544 of 1999 (R), whereby the learned Single judge allowed the appeal filed by the respondent No. 2 and set aside the award passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, ranchi in Reference Case No. 6 of 1995. The relevant facts which are not in dispute are that the appellant was appointed in 1984 on provisional basis as Library Book Sorter in Yogoda Satasanga mahavidyalaya and worked up to 1990. Thereafter, appellant left the service. In 1993, the appellant again approached the respondent for giving him appointment which was considered and appellant was appointed for a fixed period as temporary employee. After expiry of the last contract period from 1. 11. 1993 to 28. 2. 1994, the appellant was informed that this service is no more required by the respondent. The appellant then raised. Industrial dispute and ultimately, the dispute was referred to the Tribunal for adjudication. The reference case was decided in favour of the appellant and the Labour court passed an award which was challenged by the respondent by filing CWJC No. 1544 of 1999 (R ). Learned Single Judge besides other issues, had considered the question as to whether writ itself was maintained and after holding that educational institutions are not an industry within the meaning of 20) of the Industrial Disputes Act, allowed the Writ petition and quashed the award passed by the Tribunal.

(2.) IN course of argument," Mr. Sen, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has not disputed the legal position settled by the Supreme Court that the educational Institutions are not an industry within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the said Act. In that view of the matter, we are of the definite view that the learned Single Judge rightly quashed the award passed by the Labour Court holding that the respondent is neither an industry nor the appellant is a workman within the meaning of section 2 (j) of the industrial Disputes Act.

(3.) FOR the reasons discussed above, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.