LAWS(JHAR)-2015-11-18

RAJESH MOHAN Vs. STATE OF JHARKHAND AND ORS.

Decided On November 02, 2015
Rajesh Mohan Appellant
V/S
State Of Jharkhand And Ors. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 16th April, 2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) no. 2911 of 2004 whereby the petition preferred by the respondent no. 2 was allowed by the learned Single Judge, by quashing and setting-aside the award passed by the Labour Court, Deoghar, in a Reference Case no. 01 of 2002 dated 4.12.2013.

(2.) Counsel for the appellant submitted that appellant was initially appointed for six months as Stock Loading Assistant on 22nd May, 1997 and, thereafter, his period of probation was extended for one year vide letter dated 3rd December, 1997. Again services of the appellant were extended for six months vide order dated 30th November, 1998 and, thereafter, his services have been terminated with effect from 31st May, 1999. Meanwhile, two letters were also issued by the respondent Management marked as Ext. 5 and 5/a which were placed before the Labour Court, Deoghar as confidential report about this appellant which were found satisfactory and, therefore, a recommendation was made for his regularization in the services. This aspect of the matter has not at all been appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) No. 2911 of 2004 dated 16th April, 2009 deserves to be quashed and set-aside. It is further submitted by counsel for the appellant that never any letter was written by the respondentManagement about dissatisfaction of the management due to the work of this appellant. On the contrary, the respondent - Management was fully satisfied with the work of this appellant and, therefore, there was recommendation for confirmation. Even in the termination order dated 31st May, 1999 (Annexure-4 to the memo of this L.P.A.) also it has not been mentioned by the respondent -Management that the work of this appellant was not up to the satisfaction. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(L) no. 2911 of 2004 dated 16th April, 2009 deserves to be quashed and set-aside.

(3.) Counsel for the respondent no.2 submitted that the termination of the services of this appellant is a termination simpliciter and not termination punitive. The appellant was a probationer, his probation period was also extended and during this extended period of probation his services were terminated vide order dated 31st May, 1999, and there was no obligation on the part of the respondent no.2 to assign any reason for termination of the services of this appellant. If any reason will be given by the management then it may be converted into termination punitive , for which, an inquiry may be necessary, but, it is rightly appreciated by the learned Single Judge that during contract of services of a probationer, if his services are not extended such termination cannot be tantamount to retrenchment as per Section 2 (oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as it is covered by an exception carved out under Section 2 (oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Under this exception the case of this appellant is falling and, hence, termination of this appellant is not a retrenchment. Therefore, there is no question of procedure whatsoever arises under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.It is however, submitted by respondent no.2 that merely because appellant has completed 240 days of the services that does not mean that the employee has right to continue in the services. In fact, during the period of probation management is always watching the working style of the probationer and management has all power, jurisdiction and authority to terminate the services of the probationer without assigning any reason. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court.