SAROJ DEVI Vs. MANIK CHAND SARAWGI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) DEFENDANT No. 2 and the legal representatives of the deceased defendant No. 1 in Title Suit No. 24 of 1996 on the file of the Munsifs Court at Ranchi are the appellants in this second appeal. The contesting respondents, the plaintiffs, had filed a caveat and have appeared through counsel in the second appeal. Therefore, when the second appeal came up for admission under Order XLI. Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the second appeal itself was finally heard and it is being disposed of by this judgment. Counsel appearing in the case had authenticated and undisputed copies of the pleadings and the relevant documents and the said documents were referred to during the course of hearing.

(2.) THOUGH Various grounds are taken in the memorandum of second appeal, at the hearing. Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, Mr. N.N. Tiwary raised only one substantial question of law before me. That question was "whether the suit for eviction by the plaintiffs against the defendants was maintainable for want of termination of the tenancy in terms of Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act -

(3.) ADMITTEDLY , the parties entered into Exhibit > B, lease transaction, on 14.11.1975. It was a registered lease deed executed by the lessor and the lessee for a term of 20 years. The monthly rent payable was Rs. 325/ -. It was a lease of a plot of land. The lessee was to put up a construction as described in the document and the building which was put up was to be held by the lessee as a tenant for a term of 20 years with the obligation to pay the stipulated rent. On the expiry of the term of 20 years, the lessee was to vacate the premises without claiming any compensation for the building he had put up. The document stipulates that the building would be that of the lessor. The term of 20 years expired on 31.1.1996. The plaintiffs filed the suit for eviction on 21.3.1996 i.e. within two months of the expiry of the term: The defendants contended that after the expiry of the term on 31.1.1996, the lessor had accepted rent for the months of February and March, 1996 and by such acceptance of rent and the volition of the lessee to continue the relationship of lessor and lessee, a tenancy by holding over has come into being and that tenancy by operation of Section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, had to be terminated by a notice to quite, as contemplated by that section, read with Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This plea was sought to be supported by contending that the rent was paid for the months of February and March. 1996 by way of cheques to Anurag Sarawgi, one of the co -lessors, or, rather a legatee of one of the co -lessors. Anurag having accepted the cheques and encashed them through the joint account of the plaintiffs, a tenancy by holding over has come into existence. The plaintiffs met this plea by denying that rents for the months of February and March, 1996 were received by Anurag Sarawgi as pleaded by the defendants; that one of the defendants had attempted to pay those amounts into the joint account of the plaintiffs in their bank; that on coming to know of the attempt, the plaintiffs had instructed the bank to return the amounts to the person who had paid them into the account of the plaintiffs and the Bank had in fact returned the amounts to the defendants. According to them this was evident from Annexure 4/A and 4/B and in that situation, there was no question of acceptance of rent by the lessor as claimed by the lessee. It was further pointed out that the defendants had, in fact, questioned the title of Anurag Sarawgi as a legatee in the very suit and in that situation, it was highly improbable that the rent would have been paid to Anurag as claimed by the defendants. They also relied on the circumstance that for all the rents paid till the expiry of the term on 31.1.1996. formal receipts had been granted by the lessors and admittedly, no rent receipts were granted after 31.1.1996 for the alleged payment of rent for the months of February and March, 1996. Of course, they relied on the fact that the suit was filed even before the expiry of the month of March, 1996.