(1.) THE defendants are the appellants. The suit filed by the plaintiff was one for eviction under Sec. 12 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 which corresponds to Sec. 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982. The ground was default in payment of rent. The defendants denied the existence of a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. They pleaded in the written statement that the original owner of the property was one Bhagwan Prasad who had agreed to sell the property to the predecessor of the defendants and had executed an agreement to sell dated 8.4.1973 in that behalf fixing a total consideration of Rs. 6,001/ - as purchase price and their predecessor had paid a sum of Rs. 1,500.00 towards the agreed consideration and had gone into possession. There did not exist the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The suit was misconceived. It may be noted that the plaintiff claimed on the basis of a sale deed executed by Bhagwan Prasad, the owner of the property.
(2.) THE Trial Court held that the agreement for sale relied on by the defendants was not proved to be genuine. It found that the title had passed to the plaintiff. It found that the predecessor to the defendants had been let into possession by Bhagwan prasad, the admitted owner of the building, as a tenant. As the assignee, the plaintiff had become the landlord. Thus the Trial Court held that the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. Finding that rent was in arrears and the defendants have defaulted in payment of rent, the Trial Court decreed the suit. The defendants appealed. The lower appellate Court, on a reappraisal of the pleadings and the evidence adduced in the case, agreed with the conclusion of the Trial Court that the agreement for sale set up by the defendants is not proved. It further held that the finding that there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendants, was justified on the materials. The defendants have committed default in payment of rent and hence were liable to be evicted. It confirmed the decree for eviction passed by the Trial Court. This is challenged in this second appeal by the defendants.
(3.) I say that all these questions are more or less questions of fact. No doubt, in a given situation, some of the aspects to be considered would turn out to be mixed questions of facts and law. But on the facts of the case, it appears to me that the findings rendered are essentially based on an appreciation of the evidence brought on record. The Trial Court found that the agreement for sale (Ext. A) relied upon by the defendants has not been proved. It has given, in my opinion, good reasons for arriving at the conclusion. It noticed that the agreement for sale though referred to by the defendants in their written statement was not produced with the written statement filed before the Trial Court. The document was not produced along with the list of documents. It was produced only after the evidence on the side of the plaintiff was closed and the defendants started their evidence. It further noticed that even though one of the witnesses to the document was alive for examination, that witness was neither cited nor examined. Thirdly it noticed that in a prior proceeding under Section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the defendants had an opportunity and the occasion to set up this agreement for sale in their favour, this agreement for sale was never put forward as part of their case, tending to show that this agreement was not in existence as on that day. Fourthly it noticed that when an objection was raised by the defendants before the Sub -Registrar, Dumka not to register the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and the same was rejected, this agreement for sale was not put forward by the defendants as part of their objection. These, according to me, are vital circumstances the Trial Court was justified in relying on in the circumstances to come to the conclusion that the defendants have not proved the agreement for sale set up by them. It also noticed the inability of the defendant No. 2 who was examined as DW 1 to explain the omission to mention this document earlier. Thus, it was that the finding that the agreement for sale (Ext. A) was not proved by the defendants on the facts of the case was arrived at by the Trial Court. The Trial Court has not relied on any evidence that is inadmissible or any circumstance that is irrelevant. It has not misunderstood the contents of any document. It has not drawn any inference which is impermissible in law. This approach and conclusion has been affirmed by the appellate Court. It cannot be said that the finding is vitiated by any substantial error of law under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On a reappreciation of the relevant materials though it may be outside my province setting in Second Appeal. I fully agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the Trial Court and with the appellate Court in coming to the conclusion that the agreement for sale has not been proved.