JAWA KACHHAP Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Heard Sri S.N. Prasad on behalf of the petitioner and Mrs. A.R. Choudhary on behalf of the contesting respondent. The orders under challenge are dated 6th March, 1986 passed in SAR Case No. 138 of 1982-83 by respondent no. 4 and order dated 6th October, 1998 passed in Ranchi Revenue Revision No. 127 of 1987 by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi. The prayer is for a direction in the nature of mandamus for restoration of land being R.S. Plot No. 606 of Khata No. 99, Village-Bagichatoli, Tupudana, P.S.-Hatia, District-Ranchi (hereinafter referred to as the 'disputed land').

(2.) The claim of the petitioner is that the disputed land was her ancestral property and she was in cultivatory possession and also this is the only means of her livelihood. The petitioner submits that the disputed land was fraudulently transferred by virtue of a fictitious compromise in a suit in the year 1959. The petitioner's husband died during the pendency of the suit. She made an application for restoration of 30 decimals of the disputed property on 22.8.1982 under Section 71-A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act (hereinafter to be referred as the Act) before the Special Officer, Ranchi (vide SAR Case No. 138 of 1982-83). The claim was on the basis that the land was a raiyati and cultivable land. The grievance was that the contesting respondent illegally took possession of the land without any permission from the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi. SAR Officer was of the view that the possession of the contesting respondent was in violation of the provisions of Section 46 of the Act; Mahadeo Oraon was also one of the party in Title Suit. The findings given by SAR Officer was also that there was a petrol pump over the disputed land which should not have been constructed without permission of the Deputy Commissioner and that there was a substantial structure standing over the land prior to 1969. Thus, the petitioner was entitled for compensation for a sum of Rs. 20,000/-. An appeal was preferred before the Court of the Additional Collector, Ranchi, which was allowed on 6.1.1987 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition). The contesting respondent preferred a revision against the aforesaid order in appeal before the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, vide Ranchi Revenue Revision No. 127 of 1987 and the same was decided in favour of the respondent. However, matter was remanded to the Court of the learned Special Officer SAR, Ranchi to fix the compensation under the second proviso of Section 71-A of the Act. The submission of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is manifold; firstly that the revisional Court has relied upon a certificate issued by the Labour Welfare Officer to certify that there was an electricity connection in the name of Lalit Kumar & Co. in respect of a petrol pump standing on the disputed land, whereas no details about the land in question is mentioned in the certificate and, therefore, it could not be relied upon; secondly that there was no petrol pump on the disputed land and also assuming existence of petrol pump then it is not a substantial structure since the year 1961-62. It is also emphatically argued that the compromise decree in the suit was fraudulently obtained and, therefore, the grant of compensation treating the construction to be a substantial structure standing on the disputed land prior to 1969 is without any basis and, thus, the impugned orders are vitiated in law. Apparently the transfer of disputed land in the year 1959 by a compromise is nothing short of a fraud on the Court and also on the statute. Besides, the transfer is in contravention of the provisions of Section 46 of the Act. Learned counsel has placed reliance on a number of decisions; First decision relied upon is Ajay Metachem Ltd. vs. Commissioner, Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi & Others, 2001(1) Jhr. CR 278 (Jhr.) and another decision is Rambriksha Gupta vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 2003(4) JCR 206 (Jhr.). These two decisions relate to the question of transaction in violation of the provisions of Section 46 of the Act and subsequent affirmance by compromise then it has an effect of playing fraud not only on the Court but against the statute. Third decision relied upon is Kesho Sao & Anr. vs. Additional Member, Board of Revenue & Ors., 2000(4) PLJR 787. This decision is also on the question of fraudulent compromise and it was held that it can not be given effect to as it will amount to dispossessing the raiyat by fraudulent method and the last decision relied upon is Lal Phanindra Nath Sahdeo vs. State of Bihar & Ors., 2007(2) JLJR 136. This decision deals with a case of forceful dispossession adopting illegal ways and means and, therefore, will come within the purview of transfer by fraudulent method contemplated under Section 71-A of the Act.

(3.) On the basis of these decisions, learned counsel emphasized that the Courts below have failed to take into consideration that the transfer is absolutely a fraudulent; the compromise decree is also a fraud on the statute and, therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed.