CHANDRIKA PRASAD DOST Vs. STATE OF BIHAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of certtorori for quashing that part of the order dated 14.2.1992 issued by respondent No. 3, the District Establishment Deputy Collector, Ranchi whereby it has been ordered that for the period the petitioner remained under suspension, no salary or subsistence allowance shall be paid to him and also for quashing the order dated 31.5.1993 by which the suspension period has been treated not on duty.

(2.) THE facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. The petitioner was in the service of the respondents and was posted in Ranchi Treasury. In 1966 the petitioner was put under suspension by order dated 31.1.1966. Thereafter, FIR was lodged against the petitioner in May, 1967 under Section 409 of the Penal Code for having committed criminal breach of trust in respect of non -accounting of adhesive stamp worth Rs. 4,900/ - in between June, 1965 to October, 1965. After suspension the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance upto April, 1967 but from May, 1967 payment of subsistence allowance was stopped. In the meantime, on the basis of the FIR a criminal case was instituted being S.T. No. 126/69. The trial was finally concluded by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Ranchi and in terms of the judgment dated 19.6.1972, by giving benefit of doubt (since charges were not proved), the petitioner was acquitted from those charges.

(3.) I will first take up the claim of the petitioner with regard to payment of salary or subsistence allowance for the period the petitioner remained under suspension. As noticed above the petitioner was paid subsistence allowance upto April, 1967 and, thereafter, it was stopped on the ground that the petitioner was absconding since, 1967. Even assuming that the petitioner was present in the headquarters and he was finally acquitted in the criminal case in terms of the judgment dated 19.6.1972, he did not, approach the respondents either to treat his suspension period as duty period or for payment of salary/subsistence allowance. Only in 1991 he filed the aforementioned writ application challenging the order of suspension. In the judgment the learned Single Judge has taken notice of this fact that after 1972 the petitioner kept silent and started making representation only from 1990. It is, therefore, clear that from 1972 to 1990 there is no justification for the petitioner to claim any subsistence allowance or salary for the reason that for about 18 years his whereabout was neither known to the respondents nor the respondents were ever approached by the petitioner either for reinstatement or for payment of subsistence allowance/salary. However, from May, 1967 till June, 1972 when the petitioner was acquitted from the criminal charges, there are evidence on record to show that the petitioner was present in the headquarters but he did not make any attendance in the office. In my opinion, therefore, the petitioner at best would be entitled to monetary benefits by way of salary/subsistence allowance, as the case may be for the aforesaid period.