(1.) ADMITTEDLY suit land detailed in Schedule -A to the plaint of Title Suit No. 31 of 1978 belonged to Markhu Bhogta, who died leaving behind a son, namely, Sohrai Bhogta. Defendant No. 1 Budhua Bhogta was son of said Shorai Bhogta.
(2.) Plaintiffs claimed to have purchased 28 decimals land, bearing plot Nos. 530, appertaining to khata No. 117, from defendant No. 1 by registered sale deed dated 29.7.1972 2(Ext. 2A). By another sale deed dated 30.3.1973 (Ext. 2), plaintiffs further purchased lands bearing plot Nos. 531, 1447, 1448 and 1450 appertaining to khata No. 117 and plot Nos. 1442, 1443, 1446, 1451 and 1453, appertaining to khata No. 118 from the said defendant No.1. Defendant No. 1 granted receipt Ext. 1 (Safinama), in respect of receiving consideration amount for Ext. 2 from the plaintiffs. 3. Subsequently defendant No. 1 cancelled sale deed, Ext. 2 by registered deed, Ext. A. 4. Plaintiffs took step for mutation of their names in revenue records of the State, which was objected to by defendant NO.1 and was rejected. Appeal preferred against the said order rejecting the prayer for mutation by plaintiffs, was also dismissed on 24.7.1978. 5. Plaintiffs further claimed that by dint of rejection order of their petition for mutation on 25.7.1978, defendant No. 1 dispossessed them from the suit lands, except plot No. 531. 6. According to defendant NO.1 inspite of obtaining sale deed in question from him, the plaintiffs never came in possession over suit lands and he throughout continued in physical possession thereof. Transfers in question were also hit by mandatory provisions of Section 46 of the Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act, as no previous permission for such transfers was obtained from the concerned Deputy Commissioner. 7. Plaintiffs' case that they amalgamated plot Nos. 530 and 531 after purchase, was also denied and it was asserted that at the time of Harkhu Bhogta, grand -father of defendant No.1 itself, aforesaid two plots were amalgamated on spot for convenience in cultivation and story of possession and dispossession advanced by plaintiffs was imaginary. 8. Trial Court dismissed the suit holding that transfers in question made through Exts. 2 and 2 -A were illegal as hit by Section 46 of the said Act. It was further held that consideration money was also not paid and plaintiffs neither acquired any right, title and interest over the suit lands nor ever came in possession thereof. 9. In view of the fact that plaintiffs' petition for mutation was rejected, there was no occasion for granting rent receipts to them and, as such, Exts. 3 series were obtained in collusion with Revenue Karamchari concerned. 10. Plaintiffs preferred Title Appeal No. 64 of 1981, which was allowed by impugned judgment and decree dated 27.4.1985 and the suit was denied. 11. Court of appeal below, on taking into consideration ratio of Division Bench decision in Smt. Budhni Mahatain and another vs. Gobardhan Bhogta @ Gobra and others, 1984 PLJR 399, held, that it was not necessary for defendant No. 1 to obtain previous sanction of Deputy Commissioner and, therefore, sale deed Ext. 2 was valid and title in respect of suit land passed to the plaintiffs. Court of appeal below also held that Exts. 2 and 2 -A were duly executed by defendant No.1 in favour of plaintiffs and were valid and genuine and binding on the executants who had duly received consideration amount therefor. Cancellation of sale deed in question through Ext. A was not sufficient, unless the said deed was declared null and void by a competent Court of law. The Court of Appeal below did not go into the story of possession and dispossession as set up by plaintiffs in respect of the suit land. 1996(2) PLJR 260, and it was held that decision in Smt. Budhni Mahtain's case was not a good law, particularly when it did not consider a direct authority on the question of validity of Section 46 of the Act, in Shastri Pado's case, AIR 1967 Patna 25. The Full Bench, taking into consideration ratio of decision of the Apex Court in Sri Manchegowda vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1984 SC 1151, held that Budhni Mahatain's case (supra) did not lay down correct law side, so, it was rendered per incuriam. 13. In this regard Mr. P. K. Prasad, counsel for plaintiffs -respondents submitted that aforesaid Full Bench decision in Mathura Singh's case (supra) could not be given retrospective effect i.e. it cannot be applied in respect of a transaction which took place in the year 1972 -73. I find no substance in the aforesaid submission for the reason that such provision of Section 46 of the said Act for obtaining previous sanction for transfer was already in existence since the year 1955 i.e. from much earlier to the transfer in question, which were made in the year 1972 -73. 14. As such, the transfers in question, vide Exts. 2 and 2 -A were illegal and inoperative. 15. I, therefore, set aside impugned judgment and decree passed by the Court of Appeal below and confirm trial Court's judgment and decree. 16. In the result, Appeal is allowed and consequently suit stands dismissed, but without costs.