JAI MANGAL SINGH Vs. STATE OF JHARKHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) HEARD counsel for the petitioners and counsel for the Opposite Party No. 2 as well as counsel for the State.

(2.) THE petitioners in this application have prayed for quashing the order dated 01.09.2006 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad in C.P. Case No. 1111/2005 whereby cognizance for the offences under Sections 420, 406, 120B and 323 of the Indian Penal Code, has been taken against the petitioners and they have been summoned to face the trial.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners would assail the impugned order of cognizance on the ground that the same is bad in law as well as in facts and has been passed without application of judicial mind and without considering the facts of the case in proper perspective. Elaborating his arguments, learned counsel would explain that the dispute essentially is in the nature of civil dispute between the accused Nos. 1 and 2 and the complainant namely the Opposite Party No. 2 and the grievance of the Opposite Party No. 2 is in respect of the act of cancellation of the registered sale deed which the accused Nos. 1 and 2 had initially executed in favour of the complainant in respect of a land which was sold to him. Learned counsel submits further that during the pendency of the case, the complainant has compromised the case with the accused Nos. 1 and 2 and has acknowledged the possession of the land which was taken over by the accused Nos. 1 and 2 after having received the entire amount of consideration which he had initially given to the said accused persons. Learned counsel explains that the petitioner No. 1 in the present application is the transferee of the land pursuant to the sale deed executed in his favour by the accused Nos. 1 and 2 and therefore no offence under Sections 420 and 406 I.P.C. can be made out against the petitioner No. 1. As regards the petitioner Nos. 3 and 4, learned counsel submits that the offence under Sections 420 and 406 I.P.C. is also not made out against these petitioners in view of the fact that admittedly these petitioners had no role whatsoever to play either in execution of the original sale deed or cancellation of the same or in the execution of the subsequent sale deed by the accused Nos. 1 and 2. It is further submitted that in the light of the compromise effected between the complainant and the accused Nos. 1 and 2, the trial is not likely to result in the conviction of the accused persons and therefore the continuation of the criminal proceeding against the accused persons, would amount to an abuse of the process of court. Learned counsel submits further that accused No. 1 has since died during the pendency of the proceeding and it is his son namely the accused No. 2 with whom compromise has been effected by the complainant.