BALUSU GURULINGASWAMI Vs. BALUSU RAMALAKSHMAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE first of these two cases, which comes from Madras, was argued in February, 1898, but the judgment was postponed for the hearing of the second, which comes from Allahabad. The reason was that each case raises a question of general importance, on which different views have been taken by different High Courts, and it was agreed on all hands to be advantageous that the two litigations should be under consideration at the same time. The Allahabad appeal was argued in the month of July last, and their Lordships are now prepared to state their opinions on both cases.

(2.) IN the Madras case, the plaintiff sued as one in the line of succession to the last owner of an estate who had died without issue. The principal defendant was a boy who had been adopted by the last owner's widow with the consent of the family Gnatis or sapindas. The plaintiff claimed a declaration that the adoption was invalid. His main ground was that the adopted boy was the only son of his father. The defendants showed that the natural father of the boy authorized his widow to give him in adoption in the way which was actually effected between the two widows, and that the plaintiff himself, in his character of sapinda, was a party to the transaction. In addition to asserting the legal validity of the adoption, they pleaded that the plaintiff was estopped by his concurrence in it. The District Judge gave no opinion on the point of estoppel. He found that the law in Madras was settled, and he gave judgment in the following terms: The case illustrates how the people of this presidency have settled down under the law as enunciated by the Madras High Court so long ago as 1862, and reaffirmed in 1887, and it is impossible to say how many adoptions of only sons may have been made during the last thirty years on the faith of such enunciation of the law, and what innumerable rights might be disturbed by any contrary decision after such a lapse of time.

(3.) AT this bar two points have been taken: first, that the gift or reception of an only son in adoption is invalid in law; and, secondly, that, if not invalid when the boy is received by the adoptive father, or given by the natural father, it is so improper that in the absence of express authority given by a husband his widow has no power to effect it.