ANNAPURNI NACHIAR Vs. FORBES AND MENAKSHI SUNDRA NACHIAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS suit is in form instituted by the Court of Wards; in substance it is one between the two widows of Iradalaya, late owner of the impartible estate of Athumalai, who have interpleaded one another. They were both married on the same day; but it has been found that the appellant is the senior wife of the two. On July 12, 1891, Irudalaya adopted a boy called Navaneetha; on August 12, 1891, he died; and on November 16, 1891, the boy died, being then about two years old, The Court of Wards was then in possession of the estate as his guardian, and their only interest is to ascertain his heir.

(2.) THE appellant's claim is rested on the fact that she was the senior wife; the respondent, Menakshi's, on the fact, which has been found by both Courts, that the boy was adopted by Irudalaya in conjunction with her, and not in conjunction with the appellant. The District Judge held that the respondent was entitled to the estate as adoptive mother and nearest heir of the last holder, Navaneetha, and his judgment was affirmed by the High Court. That opinion is challenged in the present appeal. There has been a great deal of dispute in the Courts below upon matters of fact, but none are in dispute now. The disputed question of law is thus stated by the District Judge:

(3.) MR . Mayne has contended for the appellant that this Bangal decision is not warranted by law. He referred to sacred texts of Rishis, Manu and Baudhayana, for some fundamental principles of adoption, and to show that the good effects produced by the son of one wife enure to the benefit of other wives of the same man. But these texts are very far from showing that a wife who receives in adoption, and another who does not, stand on an equal footing as regards inheritance to the adopted boy. If applied to inheritance in the way contended for by the appellant, such texts would prove too much: they would be equally good to prove that a natural mother and her co-wife stand on an equal footing, which is clearly not the case. There is no advantage to be got from more minute criticism of these texts, nor indeed of the texts cited from the later books, Dattaka Chandrika and Dattaka Mimamsa, which are addressed to the question whether a wife's assent is necessary to an adoption, and not to this question of inheritance.