P V RAO Vs. KHUSHALDAS SADVANI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal from a judgment of Mr. Justice Bhagwati by which he ordered a writ of certiorari to issue against respondent No. 1, who is the Assistant Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Health and Local Government Department, the Province of Bombay, respondent No. 2, and Mr. Vartak, a Minister of the Government of Bombay, formerly in charge of the Health and Local Government Department, respondent No. 3. The material facts which led up to the order made by Mr. Justice Bhagwati may be briefly stated. One Abdul Hamid Ismail was, prior to January 29, 1948, the tenant of the first floor of a building known as "Paradise" at Warden Road, Bombay, the landlord of which was one Dr. M. V/s. Vakil. On January 29, 1948, Ismail assigned his tenancy to the petitioner and two others, the son and brother's daughter's son of the petitioner. All the three assignees were refugees from Sind. On February 4, 1948, the petitioner went into possession of the flat. On February 26, 1948, the Government of Bombay issued an order requisitioning the flat. The order was issued under Section 3 of the Bombay Land Requistioning Ordinance, V of 1947, which had come into force on December 4, 1947. The order purported to be issued by order of the Governor of Bombay and was signed by P.V. Rao as Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Health and Local Government Department. On the same day Mr. Rao wrote to Dr. Vakil informing him that Government had allotted the premises to Mrs. C. Dayaram. Mrs. C. Dayaram is also a refugee from Sind. On February 27, 1948, the Government of Bombay, in exercise of the powers conferred upon them by Section 8 of the Ordinance, authorised Mr. A.J. Lalvani, an Inspector of the Health and Local Government Department, to take possession of the premises. On March 4, 1948, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and an order under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. On that petition an interim injunction was granted restraining the (government from obtaining post-session of the flat. Originally the petition was directed only against respondent No. 1, but by a subsequent amendment the Province of Bombay and Mr. Vartak were brought on the record of the petition and an order was sought against them also. It is on this petition that Mr. Justice Bhagwati made the order from which this appeal is preferred.

(2.) A writ of certiorari can only be issued against an-inferior Court or against a person or persons who are required by law to act judicially or quasi-judicially. It is a high prerogative writ and its purpose is to prevent a judicial or quasi-judicial body from acting in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law or to see that in exercising its jurisdiction the body acts in conformity with principles of natural justice. Such a writ can never lie to correct executive or administrative acts. An executive or an administrative act may be illegal or ultra vires and a subject may challenge it in a Court of law, but he cannot challenge it by a writ of certiorari. The very basis and foundation of the writ is that the act complained of must be a judicial or a quasi-judicial act. The right to obtain a writ of certiorari is a very important and valuable right that the subject enjoys. It is by means of this writ that the subject can compel the judicial or quasi-judicial body to act within the four corners of its jurisdiction, and, as has been said by Lord Justice Brett in The Queen V/s. Local Government Board (1882) 10 Q.B.D. 309, the Court should not be chary of exercising its jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari and prohibition and that "wherever the legislaure entrusts to any body of persons other than to the superior Courts the power of imposing an obligation upon individuals, the Courts ought to exercise as widely as they can the power of controlling those bodies of persons if those persons admittedly attempt to exercise powers beyond the powers given to them by Act of Parliament."

(3.) Therefore, what we have to consider is whether the order passed by Government on February 26, 1948, requisitioning the premises which were in possession of the petitioner was a judicial or a quasi-judicial order. In order to determine the nature of the power conferred upon Government by the Ordinance, it is necessary to consider its nature, scope and effect, and in order to do so we must consider the scheme of the Ordinance which confers those powers. The Ordinance is entitled "An Ordinance provided for the requisition of land, for the continuance of requisition of land", and for certain other purposes. Section 3 empowers the Provincial Government to requisition any land for any public purpose if in its opinion it is necessary or expedient to do so. "Land" is defined as including benefits to arise out of land and premises and all things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to the premises or things attached to the earth. It is not disputed that under this section the Government would, have the power to requisition the premises in question. Section 4 deals with vacant premises. What are vacant premises is defined and an obligation is cast upon the landlord to give intimation if any premises become vacant, and a landlord is precluded from letting vacant premises without the permission of Government before giving such intimation and for a period of one month from the date on which such intimation is given. Sub-section (4) empowers the Government to requisition vacant premises. Section 6 provides for the payment of compensation in respect of premises requisitioned after an inquiry has been held. Section 9 confers power upon Government to take possession of requisitioned; premises. Section 10 empowers the Government, with a view to carry out the purposes of the Ordinance, to require by order any person to furnish to such authority as may be specified in that order such information in his possession as may be relevant or material. Section 11 deals with publication and service of orders.