RASHID AHMED Vs. SAHU BISHESHWAR DAYAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an unfortunate case, but it appears that the appellant himself is greatly responsible for his misfortune.

(2.) The appellant applied under Section 20, U.P. Encumbered Estates Act praying that the proceedings be quashed. The Special Judge allowed the application on 14 December 1946 in the following words: The application is allowed. The proceedings under Section 20, Encumbered Estates Act will stand-quashed subject to payment of taxable costs of the opposite parties by the applicant within a month from today. The office will mention the costs in the formal order to be prepared in connection with this order. If the costs are not paid within the aforesaid time, the application will stand dismissed with costs to opposite parties. This order did not comply strictly with the requirements of Section 20, U.P. Encumbered Estates Act which gives powers to the Special Judge to pass such order as to costs of the proceedings as he thinks proper and provides that the order for quashing proceedings shall not take effect unless the landlord, within one month of such order pays into Court the amount of any costs ordered by the, Special Judge under this section. The order for payment of costs within a specified time can be carried out only if the precise amount of costs is specified in the order. Section 20 should, therefore, be interpreted to mean that if the Special Judge thinks it proper to make (any order for the payment of costs, he should in that order specify the exact amount of costs that are required to be paid. He may not be able to do so immediately when the application is presented or when he makes up his mind to allow the application and certain calculations may have to be made by the office before the exact amount of costs is ascertained. The Special Judge may, however, postpone the making of the order unless the costs have been ascertained and calculated by his office. The order of the Court below to the effect that the office will mention the costs in the formal order was, therefore, not a suitable order as contemplated by Section 20 of the Act. The office may take a very long time, as it did in the present case, in preparing a formal order; it may in a certain case take even more than a month. In any view of the matter, if the order such as the one dated 14 December 1946, is to be deemed a proper order, the applicant will generally not get thirty clear days, howsoever quickly the office may proceed to ascertain the amount of costs. It will take at least a day or two.

(3.) In this case the formal order was prepared on 2 January, 1947, and on that date the amount of costs which the appellant was required to pay had become ascertained. The appellant, however, did not pay these costs even within thirty days of 2 January, 1947. He has not yet paid the costs shown in the formal order. He chose to make an application for the extension of time which was dismissed on 31 January 1947. The present appeal is directed against this order dated 31 January 1947.