S NARAYANAN Vs. DISTRICT BOARD BY ITS PRESIDENT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Ex. P-1 is the contract of service which the respondent, the District Board, Salem, and the plaintiff-appellant entered into for the employment of the plaintiff as the medical officer in charge of a rural dispensary for a" period of three years. The plaintiff was first posted to Elachipalayam as medical officer of the rural dispensary there. On 3 June, 1941, the services of the plaintiff were terminated (vide Ex. P-4). On appeal to the Government, the plaintiff was reinstated in service on 31 December, 1941. He was out of office between 3rd, June, 1941 and 31 December, 1941.

(2.) The plaintiff followed up his reinstatement by instituting the suit out of which; this second appeal arises. He claimed Rs. 287-7-0 by way of subsidy from the second defendant, Rs. 338- 11-0 by way of damages from the first defendant, the District Board, and, in the alternative, the entire sum of Rs. 626-2-0 as damages from the first defendant, the District Board. The trial Court held that the dismissal of the plaintiff was wrongful; but the learned District Munsiff upheld the first defendant's contention, that the suit was barred by Section 225 of the Madras Local Boards Act as it had been instituted more than six months from the date on which the cause of action arose. The plaintiff's suit was dismissed. At the stage of appeal, the first defendant-District Board accepted the correctness of the finding of the trial Court that the dismissal of the plaintiff was wrongful. The only question that the. learned District Judge considered was whether Section 225 of the Madras Local Boards Act was a bar to the plaintiff's claim. The learned District Judge. agreed with the learned District Munsiff on that issue and the appeal was dismissed. The second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff and the only respondent in the second appeal is the District Board.

(3.) The main contention of the learned advocate for the appellant was that Section 225 of the Local Boards Act and the special period of limitation prescribed thereunder did not apply to a suit to enforce contractual obligations incurred under a contract entered into by the District Board and a person like the plaintiff.