PENTAKOTA NARYUDU Vs. YELLAPU VENKATA RAMANAMURTHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This civil revision petition has been filed against the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Vizagapatam in A.S. No. 145 of 1944 affirming the decree of the District Munsif in a suit for rent for 1939-1940 and 1940-41 in respect of certain lands situated in the zamindari village of Madgole. The amount of the claim was less than Rs. 500 and hence the case comes to this Court by way of a civil revision petition. The contention of the defendants, here petitioners, is that the lands in respect of which rent is claimed are ryoti lands, that they are tenants with a permanent right of occupancy and that the suit for rent was cognizable only by a revenue Court. The respondent's case, accepted by the Courts below, is that the lands are his private lands and the suit for rent was therefore rightly filed in the Civil Court. It is stated for the petitioners that this finding is erroneous and that the lower appellate Court has misdirected itself in law in arriving at this conclusion.

(2.) There was some discussion at the bar as regards the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court in cases like the present, the respondents contention being that the findings of the lower appellate Court on the issues of fact and law are not open to review by this Court under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. Reliance was placed on their behalf of the recent decision of the Privy Council in Venkatagiri Iyengar V/s. Hindu Religious Endowments Board (1949) 1 M.L.J. 505, where the Board upset the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the ground of reversal being that even the misconstruction of a vital document governing the rights and liabilities of the parties were merely an error of law which, however grave, did not justify interference in revision under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. In so holding, the Judicial Committee reiterated their earlier views in Amir Hasan Khan's case (1884) L.R. 11 I.A. 237 : I.L.R. 11 Cal. 6 (P.C.) and Balakrishna Udayar V/s. Vasudeva Aiyar (1917) 33 M.L.J. 69 : L.R. 44 I.A. 261 : I.L.R. 40 Mad. 793 (P.C.). What the Judicial Committee laid down in this triology of cases was that where a Court had jurisdiction to determine a question of fact or law and it determined that question, it cannot be said that it had acted illegally or with material irregularity, however erroneous its determination might be and the High Court could not correct the error in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The position here is different. The suit was for rent due in respect of lands situate in an " estate " and was tried and decreed by the District Munsif and his decree was affirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge. Neither of the lower Courts would have had jurisdiction to try the case unless the lands in question were proved to be " private . lands " of the landholder, the presumption being that they are not. The objection here is to the jurisdiction of the lower Courts based both on the character of the Tribunal and the nature of the subject-matter of the dispute and does not rest merely on the ground that the lower appellate Court has erroneously found a fact or point of law, which though essential to the validity of its decree, it was competent to enquire into and decide. If the Court below has, by a decision which is found to be erroneous, given itself jurisdiction to try a suit which it has no power to entertain, this Court can interfere under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. The recent decision of the Judicial Committee referred to above deals with a different situation, namely, an erroneous decision on a question of law after jurisdiction had been legally assumed. Here the vary basis and foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court below rests on the correctness of the conclusion of the lower Court as regards the character of the lands in question and if I find that the Courts below assumed jurisdiction to try the suit for rent on an erroneous finding as to the character of the lands, I can interfere under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. See Akhayya V/s. Seetharamachandra Rao (1912) 24 M.LJ. 112 : I.L.R. 39 Mad. 195 (F.B.). Both in Amir Hasan Khan's case (1884) L.R. 11 I.A. 237 : I.L.R. 11 Cal. 6 (P.C.) and in Venkatagiri Iyengar V/s. Hindu Religious Endowments Board (1949) 1 M.L.J. 505, the Subordinate Court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute and while exercising that admitted jurisdiction, came to an erroneous conclusion on questions of law like limitation and the construction of a document. In Balakrishna Udayir V/s. Vasudeva lyer (1917) 33 M.LJ. 69 : L.R. 44 I.A. 261 : I.L.R. 40 Mad. 793 (P.C.) the District Judge by a misconstruction of a statutory provision had given himself jurisdiction to direct an election to a temple committee. This Court set aside in revision the order of the District Judge accepting the result of the election and recognising and confirming the person elected as a member of the temple commitee. The Privy Council held that as a question of jurisdiction was involved the High Court had power to interfere in revision and reverse the order of the District Judge. Section 115, Civil Procedure Code, is intended inter alia to keep Subordinate Courts within the limits of their jurisdiction. Neither the trial Court can give jurisdiction to itself, nor can the appellate Court give jurisdiction to he trial Court, by an erroneous decision and in either case, this Court is competent to interfere in revision. See a recent decision of the Privy Council in Joychand Lal Babu V/s. Kamalakshan Chowdry (1949) 2 M.I.J. 6, reported after the arguments were heard in this case.

(3.) The crucial question, therefore, in the case is whether the lands in respect of which rent is claimed are " private lands ". If they are, the Courts below would have had jurisdiction to try the suit. In arriving at a conclusion on this question, the Courts below have not disclosed in their judgments whether they had in view the relevant considerations or the governing provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act. This omission is partly responsible for the length of the arguments and of my judgment in this case.