PANANGIPALLI SURYANARAYANACHARYULU Vs. PANANGIPALLI SESHAMMA (DIED)

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal raises an interesting point of law, namely, whether the right to Archakatvam service is property within the meaning of Act XVIII of 1937, and whether from, and out of the family income of such property a maintenance holder is entitled to be maintained. The plaintiff's husband one, Gopala charyulu, was the hereditary archaka of Sri Madanagopalaswami Varu, enshrined in the village of Podagatlapalli and of Sri Venkateswaraswami Varu and Sri Kothandaramaswami Varu enshrined in the village of Vedireswaram. An extent of 32 acres and 75 cents comprised in items 2 to 10 of a schedule annexed to the plaint was in the enjoyment of the said Gopalacharyulu as Archaka service inam. Gopalacharyulu died on 1 January, 1940. The first defendant is his undivided son and the second defendant is the undivided son of the first defendant. On the death of Gopalacharyulu the first defendant has been enjoying the said archaka service inam and rendering archakatvam service personally in the temples of Venkateswaraswami and Kothandaramaswami and, through a deputy, in the temple of Madanagopalaswami Varu. In addition he also died possessed of item No. 1 in A schedule and other items mentioned in schedules B and G. The plaintiff, widow of Gopalacharyulu, and the step-mother of the first defendant, filed O.S. No. 34 of 1945, on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Amalapuram, in forma pauperis, and though she asserted her rights to claim partition in items 2 to 10 of A schedule properties, she confined her relief only to maintenance from and out of the income of the family properties. She claimed maintenance at the rate of Rs. 200 per year for arrears for the period from 1 January, 1940 to 1 January, 1944 and future maintenance at the rate of Rs. 300 a year in addition to incidental reliefs. The learned Subordinate Judge held that she was entitled to maintenance from the income of the entire A schedule properties and to a share in the houses and sites described in the B schedule properties and also in the C schedule moveables. He awarded maintenance at the rate claimed by the plaintiff both in regard to arrears of maintenance as well as future maintenance. The first defendant preferred an appeal against the decree and judgment of the lower Court. Pending appeal the plaintiff died and the legatee under the will was brought on record. In view of the supervening event the only question that remains to be considered is the right of the plaintiff to arrears of maintenance.

(2.) The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is that the archakatvam service inams comprised in item No. 2 to 10 of A schedule would not be property within the meaning of Act XVIII of 1937, and that, therefore, the plaintiff would not be entitled to a share in them under the said Act. She would not also be entitled to any maintenance from and out of the income of the said properties as the income was not the family income but only the personal income of the first defendant. The relevant provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of Act XVIII of 1937, read as follows: When a Hindu governed by the Dayabhaga School of Hindu Law dies intestate leaving any property, and when a Hindu governed by any other school of Hindu Law or by customary law dies intestate leaving separate property, his widow, or if there is more than one widow all his widows together, shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), be entitled in respect of property in respect of which he dies intestate to the same share as a son. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is as follows: When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu Law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies...having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall subject to the provisions of Sub-section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had. Under these provisions a widow would inherit the separate property of the husband and also the interest of her husband in the joint family property. In either case under Sub-section (3) the interest inherited by her shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate though she would be entitled to claim partition in regard to her share. The question is whether archakatvam service is property within the meaning of the section.

(3.) The argument of Mr. Somasundaram, the learned Counsel for the appellant, ignores the nature of the service tenure and the charge of the grant. The origin of the archakatvamservice inams is lost in antiquity. A brief history of the origin of this archakatvam service and its incidents was given by Seshagiri Aiyar, J., in his referring judgment to the Full Bench case reported in Annaya Tantri V/s. Ammakka Hengsu . In his view this archaka service grants had their origin in the time of Puranas when temples came into existence. Citing slokas from the writing of Vaidyanatha Dikshitar the learned Judge pointed out the inferior status of the archakas who were looked down upon and considered to be a very inferior class of Brahmins. Saathathapa says: A vipra (Brahmin) who performs pooja for the sake of money is known as the Devalaka; such a person becomes incompetent to participate in the usual Havya and Kavya rites enjoined on Brahmins. In another stanza he expresses that: a vipra who, though he may be well versed in the four Vedas is desirous of getting money, and who performs the worship of the Gods for the sake of another will be considered equal to a chandala. As they were looked down upon in the above manner naturally great inducements had to be offered by liberal grants of land and by the promise of perquisites. That is how the archaka office came to be founded. Large endowments were given by generous donors for the due and regular performance of the services. This right to archakatvam service ordinarily continued to be in the same family for generations and the properties pertaining to the same were being enjoyed by the members of the families for. generations. In recent years Courts have introduced. the three- pronged classification in regard to the said grants. In Subramaniam V/s. Srivaikuntam Kailasanathaswami Koil (1933) 39 L.W. 389, Venkatasubba Rao, J., observed: There are three possible views that may be taken of grants of this kind; first, that the land was granted to the institution; secondly, that it was intended to be attached to a particular office; and thirdly, that it was granted to a named individual, burdened with service, the person so named, happening to be the office-holder, at the time of the grant. As observed by another learned Judge, these nice short quillets of law are of comparatively recent origin and are modern innovations. But it is too late in the day to wipe out these, distinctions or ignore the classifications. Even so the question arises whether the archaka office to which perquisites are attached is property within the meaning of Act XVIII-of 1937. If the lands were granted to the archakas burdened with service no difficulty would arise as the property is that of the grantee just like any other property but in the case of archaka service inams. the nature of the income from the lands depends upon the office. In this, case no evidence has .been placed before the lower Court in regard to the nature of the grant but a perusal of the pleadings show that both the parties assumed that items 2 to 10 of A schedule are not lands burdened with service but only service inams. We shall proceed to consider the question raised in the appeal on that assumption. If the office is property within the meaning of Act XVIII of 1937 succession to the property will be governed by the provisions of the Act in which case the plaintiff would be entitled to succeed to the property in the manner prescribed by the Act.