RAMASWAMI GOUNDAN Vs. LAKSHMANA REDDI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) There is a Mari Amman temple in a village called Thammampatti and a Selli Amman temple in Koneripatti, a hamlet of the above village. The two plaintiffs claimed two different rights but we are concerned in this appeal only with the right claimed by the first plaintiff. The right claimed by him is the right to lead the horse on a particular festival day whenever that festival is performed. It is said that this festival is not performed every year or at stated intervals but it is performed whenever funds permit. The right that is claimed is not a right to worship but a right to an office. It is claimed that leading the horse is an office, that the plaintiff and his predecessors have been performing this office from generation to generation and that therefore the plaintiff is entitled to be protected against disturbance from the defendants. The District Munsif of Salem decreed the suit holding that the plaintiff had established his right. On appeal the Subordinate Judge of Salem upheld the contention but he made a very important addition lo the decree of the trial Court. He held in effect that the first plaintiff could not be compelled to perform this act of leading the horse and that if he did not bring a horse at the time of the festival and was not willing to lead it, the defendants would be entitled to make other arrangements for the conduct of the festival. The decree of the Subordinate Judge accordingly directs that in the event of the first plaintiff's failure or refusal to lead the horse, the Perithanakars and Kariakars are entitled to make other necessary arrangements for the conduct of the festival. With this modification the Subordinate Judge confirmed the decree granted by the trial Court. There was a second appeal filed in this Court and the appeal was disposed of by King, J. He confirmed the decree of the Subordinate Judge but granted a certificate under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

(2.) We are concerned in this appeal with the question whether the right that is claimed by the first plaintiff is to an office which can be made the subject-matter of a suit in a Civil Court under Section 9 of the Civil P. C.. That section says that, The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

(3.) An explanation is added that a suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. The point that we have got to decide is whether the suit in this case is of a civil nature and whether it is for a right to an office. There are admittedly no emoluments attached to the office. As was held by this Court in Srinivasa Thathachariar V/s. Srinivasa Aiyangar (1899) 9 M.L.J. 355, the conception of an office involves a corresponding obligation to perform the duties of the office. It was pointed put by the learned Officiating Chief justice at page 358 that, The term, office, in the sense with which we are concerned, implies, of course, a duty in the office-holder to be discharged by him as such - see if authority were necessary, Kent's Commentaries where it is pointed out, offices consist in a right, and correspondent duty, to execute a public or private trust and to take the emoluments belonging to it .