BIGAN SINGH Vs. SAYID SHAH ZAFFER HUSSAIN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by the judgment-debtor from a decision of the Subordinate Judge of Gaya confirming a decision of the Munsif of Aurangabad. The respondent obtained a decree for rent against the appellant and on 9 February 1938, applied to execute the decree. On 7 March the executing Court directed the issue of a writ of attachment and a sale proclamation, fixing the 5 May as the date of sale. The writ and the sale proclamation were not actually issued until 28 March. On the date fixed for the sale, namely the 15 (sic) May, the judgment-debtor objected to the sale being held on the ground that the Court had not valued the property to be sold as required by Section 163(5), Bihar Tenancy Act. This Sub- section (5) was introduced into the Tenancy Act by an amending Act which came into operation on 10 March 1938.

(2.) The question for decision is whether, in view of the provisions introduced by the amending Act, it was necessary for the Court to issue notice to the judgment- debtor before issuing the sale proclamation and to decide whether the whole or only a part of the property should be put up for sale and what the value of the whole or part was. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that the amending Act being one regulating the procedure of the Court governs all proceedings that were pending when the Act came into operation: while, on behalf of the respondent, it is urged that in the absence of express provision in the Act it was only such steps as remained to be taken after the Act came into operation that are governed by its provisions.

(3.) We have been referred to a large number of cases in which the effect of an amendment of the law on pending proceedings has been the subject-matter of consideration. The general principle which emerges from these cases is that the amending Act does not affect rights which have vested or obligations which have been defined before the amending Act comes into operation but that no person has a vested right in the procedure of a Court Republic of Costa Rica V/s. Erlanger (1876) 3 Ch D 62 and consequently, an Act which merely regulates procedure governs all proceedings that are pending at the time when the Act comes into operation Per Wilde J. in Wright V/s. Hale (1860) 6 H & N 227 provided that existing orders are not deprived of their finality Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. V/s. Income- tax. Commissioner of Delhi and that the application of the provisions of the Act does not work injustice.