MADIPALLI VENKATACHELLAM Vs. MADIPALLI SURYANARAYANAMURTY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Defendant 1 is the appellant. He is the son of one Chelamiah who died on 15 October 1925 at a great age. Defendant 2 is the brother of defendant 1 and the plaintiff is the third brother. The following facts were stated from the bar and were accepted. In April or October 1917 - at this stage it is not necessary to be more precise about the date - the family became divided in status. In 1920, defendant 2 filed, but subsequently withdrew, a suit for partition, but on 22 May, 1921 there was a muchilika entered into between the parties with a view to dividing the property. On that there was a reference to arbitration by the plaintiff and the defendants and it is on that reference that this matter comes before this Court, having been first of all decided by the District Judge of East Godavari. That is all that is necessary at present with regard to the facts, because what is now being dealt with may be called a preliminary point. It can be shortly stated. Mr. V.V. Srinivasa Iyengar for defendant 1 has raised a point which was referred to but not decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ramlal Hargopal V/s. Kishanchand ( 24) 11 A.I.R. 1924 P.C. 95. The point in question is dealt with by Lord Phillimore at p. 372. His Lordship said: It was contended on behalf of the appellant that if an award relates to more than one subject-matter and only one is within the jurisdiction of the Court, it cannot be filed in that Court; in fact, that it can be filed in no Court, because no one Court would have jurisdiction over the whole subject-matter. Their Lordships deem it unnecessary to rest their judgment on any such general proposition.

(2.) Lord Phillimore went on to point out why it was unnecessary to decide that point. His reason was this, namely, that it was evident to their Lordships that the property concerned in the case before them was property wholly outside British India and that in the words of their Lordships there was no dispute concerning the ownership and management of properties within the jurisdiction. It must, therefore, be emphasised in that case that what was before the lower Court was an application under para. 20, of Schedule 2, Civil P.C., relating to property wholly outside the jurisdiction of the Courts of British India. What is the procedure set out in Schedule 2? Clause 20 is headed "arbitration without the intervention of a Court" and it says: Where any matter has been referred to arbitration without the intervention of a Court, and an award has been made thereon, any person interested in the award may apply to any Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the award that the award be filed in Court.

(3.) And in the case to which I have just referred there was an application to the Court to file an award with regard to property wholly outside British India. In this case it is not necessary to say more than this, that admittedly this award dealt with property and part of it was immovable property within the jurisdiction of the District fudge of East Godavari and part of it outside his jurisdiction, as that term is ordinarily understood. Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar has argued before us exactly the point that was referred to by Lord Phillimore. His argument is that Clause 20 of Schedule 2 to the Code states that the person interested in the award may apply to any Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the award and that means "to a Court having jurisdiction over the whole of the subject-matter of the award" and that, as admittedly part of the subject-matter of this award is situated outside East Godavari judicial district, the District Judge had no jurisdiction. And Mr. Srinivasa Iyengar has also not recoiled from the position that no Judge had any jurisdiction to make an order under Clause 20 in regard to this matter, because once it is conceded that the subject-matter is in more than one jurisdiction, it must follow that no Judge in any one jurisdiction can have jurisdiction over it. That seems to me to be a startling proposition and. it is difficult to suppose that the Legislature can have contemplated the results it would produce in numerous cases - for, it naturally and frequently happens - especially on the borders of districts that family lands are partly in one district and partly in another. But authorities have been cited to us which, according to the learned Counsel for the appellant, are said to support the proposition. 11 is as well to state that no authority has been cited to us covering facts similar to the facts now under consideration.