SRI NARAIN KHANNA Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application on behalf of one Sri Narain Khanna for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council against an appellate decision of this Court in F.A. No. 166 of 1935. The application is made under Section 110, Civil P.C., and Section 109(c), Civil P.C., has been added today. The facts are that there was a land acquisition case in Meerut and Sri Narain Khanna made an application under the Land Acquisition Act to the District Judge and the District Judge granted Rs. 26,238. Sri Narain Khanna appealed to this Court and we increased that amount by Rs. 9902 and allowed interest. The amount claimed by Sri Narain Khanna before the District Judge and in this Court and in the proposed appeal to the Privy Council is over Rupees 10,000. The first question is whether he has a right of appeal under Section 110, Civil P.C. This provides: And where the decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such decree or final order, the appeal must involve some substantial question of law.

(2.) Learned Counsel claims that it is not necessary to show a substantial question of law because the decree of this Court does not affirm the decision of the District Judge. Now, the decision of this Court affirms the decision of the District Judge so far as the ii-rant by the District Judge of Rs. 26,238 in concerned. The decree of this Court grants a further amount in favour of the appellant of Rs. 9902. It is not against this further increase that the appellant desires to appeal as that increase is in his favour. It appears to us that the natural construction of the wording of Section 110 is that this is a, case whore the decree has affirmed the decision of the Court below. The decision of the Court below was that Rs. 26,238 should be granted to Sri Narain Khanna and that decision stands good and is therefore affirmed. Some metaphysical argument was made that the decree of the District Judge read by inversion means that nothing snore could be granted and this Court did grant something more and therefore it should be read as varying the decree of the District Judge. We do not think that this is a fair construction of the language of Section 110, Civil P.C.

(3.) Reference was made by learned Counsel to a case not yet reported, P.C.A. No. 24 of Mt. Raj Dei Bibi V/s. Babu Radhika Prasad P.C.A. No. 24 of 1938, decided by another Bench of this Court on 16 September 1938. The facts of that case were that the trial Court had dismissed the suit of the plaintiff against defendant 7. Plaintiff appealed and the High Court decreed Rs. 8872-8-0 for the plaintiff against defendant 7 and the plaintiff desired to appeal to the Privy Council for a larger sum. The Bench held that this was a case where the decree or final order of the trial Court had not been affirmed. The decree of the trial Court was that the plaintiff should receive nothing from defendant 7. That was certainly not upheld by the High Court and therefore the case is in our opinion quite a different one from the present case. The view which we have taken has been held by this Bench in a reported ruling, Wiqar Ali Khan V/s. Narain Das , and that follows another reported ruling, Kamal Nath V/s. Bithal Das (1922) 9 A.I.R. All. 89. It is true that some observations were made against the validity of this ruling by the late learned Chief Justice in Nathu Lal V/s. Raghubir Singh to the effect that by implication their Lordships of the Privy Council had overruled that view of law in Annapurna Bai v. Ruprao but that view was not stated in the judgments of the other two learned Judges in that Pull Bench. We have distinguished this ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the reported ruling, Waqar Ali Khan V/s. Narain Das (1938) 26 A.I.R. All. 322. We consider therefore that to bring the case under Section 110 it must be shown that the appeal involves some substantial question of law. Now, the grounds of appeal do refer to certain questions of law and these questions relate to the method of arriving at the value of bungalows for the purposes of land acquisition. In our opinion they are substantial questions of law. Permission has already been given to the Secretary of State to appeal from this particular decision of this Court on these questions. We think therefore that it is a case where permission should be granted and accordingly we certify that this case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council.