ANANDI PRASAD Vs. MTDULHIN KISHORI KUER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application taken out under Section 302, Succession Act, with regard to annuity payable under a will dated 19 February 1930. The testator died in the same year, indeed the next day, leaving an absolute estate to his widow subject to a payment to the petitioning College of a sum of Rs. 700 per annum. The relevant words in the will are: It shall be proper on the part of the Musammat to continue to pay, after my demise, a sum of Rs. 700 (seven hundred rupees) out of the income of my properties to the Nalanda College at Bihar, annually and make over every year a sum of Rs. 700 to the Trustees of the said college for expenses of the school department; and then follows: and this amount of rupees seven hundred shall all along be continued to be paid every year by the said Musammat.

(2.) The first point taken was the question of jurisdiction and it was contended that the application did not lie under Section 302, Succession Act, which containsprovisions merely for the purpose of determining questions raised by the executor or trustees calling the assistance of the Court as regards the administration of the estate. At first I felt inclined to hold that that was the correct view to be taken of Section 302; but it seems to me perfectly clear that this point has been decided, if not directly, by inference, by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Secretary of State V/s. Srimati Parijat Debi . One of the main questions which came to be decided in that case, was whether it was necessary for the applicant, who was the mother of a beneficiary under the will, to take out a succession certificate, as against a debtor under Section 214, Succession Act. It was held by the Courts in India and by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that the Administrator-General of Bengal, against whom the application was made was not a debtor within the meaning of that Section. I said that the matter of Section 302 was decided by inference if not expressly.

(3.) The short answer to the case would have been that the application did not lie under the Section. But their Lordships expressly mentioned the Section and there was no argument suggesting that the application could not be maintained. It may be that I am not correctly stating the decision of their Lordships with regard to Section 302, as it would appear at p. 73 of the Report that this very question was at least mentioned. Their Lordships observed as follows: Their Lordships are of opinion that there is nothing in the order of Costello J. dated 17 March 1931, which does not come within the material words of Section 302; and then quoting: "in regard to the estate or in regard to the administration thereof."