MADHAB CHANDRA GHOSE Vs. NIROD CHANDRA GHOSE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a second appeal by the defendants in a suit for recovery of Rs. 500 as damages on the ground that they had made certain defamatory state, meats against the plaintiff by sending certain reports to the police and giving false evidence in two criminal cases. Shortly stated, the allegations are these: On 21 November 1934 defendant 3 sent a report to the officer of the Moulvi Bazar Police Station alleging that one Alhadini, a widow, had given birth to a child, that Nirod Chandra Ghose, the plaintiff, was responsible for the illicit pregnancy of the woman, and that the child had been killed. This report was followed up by two other reports which were sent by defendant 1 and defendant 3 to the police. As the result, the police officer started investigation. It is said that during the investigation the police officers were resisted by the plaintiff and his party. The result was that the Sub-Inspector of Police, Gopal Chandra Ghose, instituted a case under Section 147 and other Secs.of the Indian Penal Code against the plaintiff and others. The police also sent up Alhadini and others on charges under Section 302 read with other Secs.of the Indian Penal Code. Defendants 1 to 5 deposed in those two cases. But ultimately in both the cases the accused were acquitted. The plaintiff has therefore brought the suit for damages basing his claim on the statements made to the police and in the depositions in the aforesaid judicial proceedings. The defence substantially is that the defendant acted in good faith and that the allegations are true. The trial Court has found that the defendants conspired with one another, that the informations given to the police were false, that the depositions made by the defendants in the aforesaid cases were also false, and that as the result the plaintiff has been lowered in the estimation of the public. On these findings the trial Court gave a decree for a sum of Rs. 200 against defendants 1 to 5. On appeal the lower Appellate Court agreed with the trial Court. Hence this second appeal.

(2.) The contention on behalf of the appellants in this appeal is that the suit must be taken as one for damages for defamation and not for malicious prosecution and that a civil suit for damages for defamation in respect of statements in judicial proceedings or on occasions leading to such judicial proceedings does not lie. The law on the subject is summarized by Sir Asutosh Mukerjee in Satis Chandra Chakraburty V/s. Ram Dayal De (1921) 8 A.I.R. Cal. 1. That was a criminal matter but Mukherjee J. considered the distinction between civil liability and criminal liability with regard to a claim for damages for defamation. He points out that as regards civil liability there is no codified law in India and that as regards criminal liability the relevant provisions are to be found in the Indian Penal Code. The position then, as he says, is that the questions relating to civil liability for damages for defamation must be determined with reference to either the rules of English Common law where they are shown to be applicable and with reference to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience in all other cases. It will be instructive to quote the head-note: If a party to a judicial proceeding is sued in a Civil Court for damages for defamation in respect of a statement made therein on oath or otherwise, his liability in the absence of statutory rules applicable to the subject must be determined with reference to principles of justice, equity and good conscience. There is a large preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the view that the principles of justice, equity and good conscience applicable in such circumstances should be identical with the correspondent relevant rules of the Common law of England. A small minority favours the view that the principles of justice, equity and good conscience should be identical with the rules embodied in the Indian Penal Code.

(3.) The view favoured by Mookherjee J. with regard to civil liability finds support in the observations of the Judicial Committee in Gunesh Dutt V/s. Mugneeram (1873) 11 Beng L.R. 321: heir Lordships hold this maxim which certainly has been recognized by all Courts of this country, to be one based upon principles of public policy. The ground of it is this, that it concerns the public of the administration of justice that witnesses giving their evidence on oath in a Court of justice should not have before their eyes the fear of being harassed by suits for damages; but that the only penalty which they should incur it they give evidence falsely should be an indictment for perjury.