TARAK NATH KUNDU Vs. PANCHANON DUTT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This rule is directed against an order of the Munsif, First Court, Howrah, dated 19 April 1939, by which he refused to stay certain proceedings in execution of a decree in spite of a notice sent to him by the Jagadishpur Debt Settlement Board under Section 34, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. The decree was one for a sum of Rs. 1200 only, obtained by the opposite party against the petitioner, on the basis of a promissory note in the original side of this Court. On the application of the decree-holder it was transmitted for execution to the Court of the Munsif, First Court, Howrah, and the decree-holder applied for attachment and sale of certain immovable properties, belonging to the judgment-debtor which were situated within the jurisdiction of that Court. The judgment-debtor there, upon presented an application under Section 8, Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, to the Jagadishpur Debt Settlement Board for settlement of his debts, and the latter issued a notice under Section 34 of the Act, requesting the executing Court to stay further proceedings in execution of the decree. The Munsif has refused to stay the proceedings on the ground that the decree being passed by the High Court, Section 34, Agricultural Debtors Act, did not apply, and he has relied upon the Special Bench decision of this Court in Narsing Das V/s. Chogemull . The propriety of this view has been challenged by Mr. Chandra Sekhar Sen who appears in support of the rule and his contention is that the Special Bench decision has no application to the facts of the present case where the proceedings sought to be stayed are not before the High Court but before a Civil Court which is subordinate to this Court. In the Special Bench case undoubtedly the proceedings in execution were pending in the original side of this Court in respect of a decree passed by itself, and as according to the opinion expressed by the majority of the Judges who composed the Bench, the expression "Civil Court," as used in the Agricultural Debtors Act, was held not to include the High Court, the operation of Section 34 of the Act was necessarily excluded. In the opinion of the other two Judges who did not accept this view, the expression "Civil Court" did include the High Court, but the provisions of Section 34 of the Act, so far as they related to proceedings of the High Court in its original side, were ultra vires and hence inoperative. The Special Bench decision therefore does not directly touch the present case, where the proceedings are not before the High Court itself.

(2.) I think however that if the expression "Civil Court" as used in the various Secs.of the Agricultural Debtor's Act be taken to mean a Court of civil jurisdiction separate from and subordinate to the High Court as held by the majority of the Judges in the Special Bench case, the conclusion would be irresistible that a debt payable under the decree of the original side of this Court would not be a debt within the meaning of the Agricultural Debtors Act. It would not be within the competence of the Debt -Settlement Board constituted under the Act to settle such debts, and no proceeding in respect of the same could be stayed by a notice under Section 34. In no other way I think we can consistently explain the various Secs.of the Act, and find out a rational basis for the scheme which underlies it. Agreeably with the view taken by the majority of the Judges in the Special Bench case, we must assume that the Legislature when it passed this enactment was aware of its own limitations, that it did not intend to trench upon the jurisdiction of the High Court derived from Parliament and that in all the Sections where the words "Civil Court" were used it intended to exclude the High Court. If this is the correct position, the Legislature, in my opinion, never intended that a debt which was payable under a decree of the original side of the High Court would come within the purview of the Agricultural Debtors Act at all. I will first of all examine the definition of debt as given in Section 2(8) of the Act. Debt as defined in that sub-section includes all liabilities of a debtor in cash or in kind, secured or unsecured, whether payable under a decree or order of a Civil Court or otherwise, and whether payable presently or in future. Then follow certain exceptions which we need not mention at this stage. If a debt is payable under a decree, then to come within this definition it must be under a decree or order of a Civil Court and a decree passed by the High Court, must, in my opinion, be deemed to have been excluded. The expression "or otherwise", I think, would mean debt not founded on a decree, and even if it includes decretal debts, they would be decrees passed by other Courts, e.g. the Revenue Court, but not by the High Court. This view is fortified by the provision of Section 18(1) which provides that a decree of a Civil Court relating to a debt shall be conclusive evidence as to the existence and amount of the debt as between the parties to the decree. It might sound absurd that a decree passed by an inferior Court would be held final by the Debt Settlement Board, whereas no value need be attached to a decree of the High Court. But this incongruity will disappear if we hold that a decree of the High Court being outside the Act, the Debt Settlement Board would have no jurisdiction to consider it at all or appraise its value.

(3.) This interpretation would not be in any way inconsistent with the object of the Act as explained in the Preamble. The object was undoubtedly to give relief to certain classes of debtors, but not certainly in respect of all their liabilities. There are exceptions stated in the Section itself, e.g. public demands and debts due to a Scheduled Bank. Other debts must also be deemed to be excluded which were beyond the competence of the Legislature to deal with, if the Legislature acted with full sense of its limitations and wanted to avoid anything which would be in excess "of its powers. This conclusion would be irresistible if we come to the provisions of Secs.25(3), 33, 35 and 36 of the Act, which are aimed at ousting the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in cases where the Debt Settlement Board can deal with the matters exclusively under the provisions of the Act. The result of the Special Bench decision is that the High Court would have jurisdiction in spite of Section 33 of the Act to entertain a suit or proceeding in respect of a debt, even though it is included in an application under Section 8 of the Act. A decree passed by the High Court could be executed though the matter is before the Debt Settlement Board, and such decree would be operative and binding even if it is against the decision of the Debt Settlement Board. An award under Section 25 would not prevail over a decision of the High Court and nothing but confusion and anomaly would result if both the award of the Board and the decree of the High Court are deemed to be valid and binding. I hold therefore that the Legislature definitely intended to exclude a debt founded on a decree of the High Court from the scheme of the Act, and Section 2(8) should be interpreted in such a way as would give effect to this intention of the Legislature. This would prevent anomalies and place all the provisions of this Act on a consistent and logical basis. In this view of the case, Section 34 of the Act would have no application inasmuch as there is no proceeding in respect of a debt, even though the Court is a Civil Court within the meaning of the Special Bench decision. The object of Section 34 is to stay proceedings in Civil Courts pending settlement of debt by the Debt Settlement Board. It helps to avoid conflicts which would otherwise result from the operation of Secs.35 and 36. But if these other Sections are not applicable, there can be no sense in applying Section 34 which is merely ancillary to the other provisions. I hold therefore that Section 34 would not apply to this case and the Munsif could not be called upon to stay the proceedings.