VISWANADHULA GURAYYA Vs. DANTURTHI VENKATARATNAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent to this petition brought a suit for rent. Certain objections were taken and issues framed. The matter was then brought up to this Court in revision and the then learned Chief Justice allowed the revision petition in part and remanded the suit to the lower Court for fresh disposal.

(2.) After remand, the defendants put in an application to file an additional written statement to the effect that the Court had no jurisdiction by virtue of the passing of Act XVIII of 1936 by the provisions of which the petitioners became ryots of land situated within an estate, within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, and that therefore a suit for rent would lie only in a Revenue Court. That petition was dismissed on the ground that the plea had been raised too late.

(3.) It seems to have been admitted even in the lower Court - and it certainly has been here - that the rent is payable on land lying within an "estate". That being so, the Court having jurisdiction would be a Revenue Court; and the only question that arises in this petition is whether the Court that had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, lost jurisdiction subsequently on account of the passing of the Act. It is argued that if a Court had lawful seisin of the matter, it could not lose it merely because of the passing of a subsequent enactment, unless there is an express provision depriving Courts of jurisdiction in pending suits. Such a provision one does not find in Act XVIII of 1936. Two cases have been discussed befo re me bearing on this point. One is Kondappa Naidu V/s. Mahalakshmamma (1938) 1 M.L.J. 206, which was decided by a Bench of this Court, in which the judgment was delivered by Venkatasubba Rao, J. That was a case in which there had been a stay of pending Letters Patent Appeal because of Section 127 of the 1934 Act. It was taken up for hearing again only after the passing of Act XVIII of 1936. Section 13 of that Act provides that all proceedings stayed under Section 127 of the 1934 Act shall be disposed of as if the Act of 1908 as amended by the 1934 and 1936 Acts had been in force at the original institution of the proceedings. The learned Judges could therefore have decided the case on that point; but although Venkatasubba Rao, J., refers to Section 3 in passing, the learned Judges preferred to go beyond the narrow limitations of Section 13 and to decide the case on a much broader principle of law. Venkatasubba Rao, J., says: By reason of the new definition of the word "estate", the village must be deemed to have always and throughout been an estate.