SRIPAT SINGH DUGAR Vs. RANI MOHINI SUNDARI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE short point raised for determination in this Rule is the interpretation of the words "any person interested" in Section 39, Guardians and "Wards Act, and it does not appear that it has ever been raised before. THE opposite party was appointed guardian of the properties of two wealthy minors. THE petitioner filed an application for her removal under Section 39 of the Act. THE District Judge without considering the application on its merits dismissed it as incompetent. In view of a report submitted by an auditor of the accounts it appeared that all was not well with the administration of the estate and the learned Judge proposed to consider the matter on his own motion. THE petitioner then obtained this Rule. THE term "any person interested" is obviouly very wide. Possibly it might be easier to say whom it excludes rather than whom it includes. We do not propose, and in fact the learned Advocate General did not ask us, to attempt to formulate any definition or to give any comprehensive explanation of the term. We shall merely consider whether on the facts of the present case the petitioner has brought himself within the Section. THE learned District Judge found the petitioner to be at enmity with the opposite party and on that finding alone he came to the conclusion that the petitioner is not a "person interested." In other words he has come to a finding as to the motive actuating the petitioner. He did not consider the real point at issue. In our opinion the matter cannot be decided merely with reference to something subjective in the mind of the applicant but some objective meaning must be given to the term. THE petitioner is the first cousin, once removed, of the minors. He is thus within the terms of Section 8(b) of the Act and thereby entitled to make an application for the appointment of a guardian Indeed a special notice was issued on him by the learned Judge himself in connexion with the actual appointment. In our opinion, the fact that he comes within the terms of Section 8 is quite enough to make him personally interested within the meaning of Section 39 of the Act. We accordingly make the Rule absolute. We set aside the order of the District Judge and direct him to hear and determine the application in accordance with law. We make no order as to costs in this Rule. No order is necessary on the other Rule (1465/38). Khundkar, J.

(2.) I agree.