THADI CHANDRAYYA Vs. VAITLA SEETHANNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question which arises in this appeal is one of limitation. The suit was filed by the first respondent in the Court of the District Munsif of Ramachandrapur. He was the reversioner to the estate of one Ramanna, which after Ramanna's death devolved upon his daughter Pullamma. The reversion opened on the 3 July, 1916, when Pullamma died. The first respondent was born on the 1 November, 1908, and therefore attained his majority on 1st November, 1926, which gave him until 1 November, 1929, in which to file the suit. On the 30 October, 1929, he filed a plaint in the Court of the District Munsif and asked for possession of the suit properties from the appellants, who were in possession under the alienations created by Pullamma. In the plaint, the properties were described in two schedules, A and B. The properties in schedule A were valued at Rs. 693 and the mesne profits thereof at Rs. 2,040. The properties in schedule B were valued at Rs. 250. In their written statement the appellants challenged the correctness of the valuation of the properties in B schedule. They contended that there had been gross under valuation. The consequence was that the District Munsif directed the appointment of a Commissioner to estimate the value of the properties. But the plaintiff deliberately abstained from taking out the commission, and from this conduct the District Munsif drew the legitimate inference that the aggregate value of the properties mentioned in the plaint was over Rs. 3,000 and he therefore held that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. On 6 August, 1930, the District Munsif accordingly returned the plaint to the first respondent for presentation to the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The first respondent took the plaint away, amended it by striking out his claim for possession of the properties mentioned in B Schedule, and later in the day re-presented it to the District Munsif. On the 11 August, 1930, the District Munsif again returned the plaint to the first respondent as he considered that it was a new suit and which necessitated the riling of a new vakalat. On the 14 August, 1930, the first respondent's pleader re-presented the plaint without filing a fresh vakalat. He contended that the plaint was a continuation of the plaint which was presented on the 30 October, 1929. On the 15 August, 1930, the Court once more returned the plaint to the first respondent, intimating that it must be treated as a fresh suit. On that date the first respondent's pleader re-presented it with an application that the amendment which he had made might be allowed and the plaint approved. He also asked that the plaint should retain its old number. The District Munsif agreed to this course and passed a formal order of the nature indicated.

(2.) The only question which arises now is whether the suit must be deemed to have been instituted on the 30 October, 1929, when the original plaint was presented, or on the 6th August, 1930, when the plaint was re-presented after it had been returned by the District Munsif for filing in the proper Court and had been amended by the elimination of Schedule B and the relief claimed in respect of the properties therein mentioned. The District Munsif held that the suit must be deemed to have been filed on the 6 August, 1930, and therefore was barred by the law of limitation. On appeal the Subordinate Judge of Rajahmundry held that the suit was in time, as in his opinion the correct date was 30 October, 1929. On second appeal Wadsworth, J., agreed with the Subordinate Judge, but gave a certificate for a further appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The learned Judge considered that the filing of the amended plaint on the 6 August, 1930, must be deemed to be a continuation of the suit which was filed on the 30 October, 1929 and therefore was in time.

(3.) We are of the opinion that the District Munsif was right and that the date of the institution of the suit must be taken to be 6 August, 1930. In Kannuswami Pillai V/s. Jagathambal Sadasiva Aiyar, J., held that when a Court of first instance has decided that a suit is beyond its jurisdiction it has no power to pass any other judicial order, except those which statute expressly empowers it to pass, such as an order returning the plaint for presentation to the proper Court under Order 7, Rule 10 of the Civil P. C. or an order awarding costs under Section 35 of the Code. We agree with this statement. A Court which has no jurisdiction cannot pass orders in the suit beyond directing the plaint to be presented to the proper Court and giving a direction with regard to the costs incurred up to the time of the return of the plaint. The opinion of Sadasiva Aiyar, J., was shared by Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Govindaraju Naicker V/s. Kassim Sahib (1927) 54 M.L.J. 409.