JAGANNATH PRASAD SURAJ PRAKASH VERMA Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE applicant J.P. Verma was ordered to execute a bond under Section 108(b), Criminal P.C., for Rs. 200 to be of good behaviour for a year. He having declined to execute the bond, was ordered to be detained in prison for one year unless he executed the bond earlier. His appeal was dismissed and he has moved this Court in revision. The proceedings under Section 108(b), Criminal P.C, were initiated against him on a formal complaint by the City Superintendent of Police, Nagpur, made on 8th March 1938. The gist of the complaint was that the. applicant, who was the Secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, Nagpur, was in the habit of delivering speeches which were deliberately calculated to promote feelings of hatred and enmity between the Hindus and Muslims and that in view of the tension arising from acute political controversies between the "adherents of the Hindu Sabha and the Muslim League as well as other specified incidents, there was a likelihood of an imminent breach of the peace unless preventive action was taken against him.' To support the complaint copies of three speeches delivered ON 12th January 1938, 31st January 1938 and 14th February 1938 were filed; Copies of seven earlier speeches were also produced to throw light on the intention of the speaker. On behalf of the applicant is presented a lengthy and vehement argument which spares no conceivable angle of attack against the order. The legality of the entire proceedings including the final order is challenged on the ground that the preliminary' order made Under Section 112, Criminal P.C, was defective in its failure to disclose the substance of the information laid against the applicant. The Order runs as follows: Whereas from the complaint of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nagpur City, I.N.V. Joshi, Additional District Magistrate, Nagpur, have been informed that J.P. Verma,...has been disseminating by means of speeches matters promoting enmity and hatred between Hindus and Muasalmans the publication of which his' punishable under Section 153, I.P.C.

(2.) ONE fails to see what more could have been stated in the preliminary order to convey to the party concerned the substance of the information beyond indicating that he had been making speeches of a character which would justify an action against him under Clause (b) of Section 108, Criminal P.C. There has indeed been some divergence of judicial opinion and I may briefly refer to the relevant decisions. In Kalia Goundan In re (1930) 17 AIR Mad 859 the order contained nothing more than the statement that, there existed a faction and there was a likelihood of breach of the peace. There was no abstract of facts upon which the Magistrate could reasonably proceed against them and there was no material from which the counter-petitioners could possibly know the case they had to meet. Pandalai J. set aside the final order not on the ground that the preliminary order was void and incurable but on the ground that it had occasioned failure of justice. In Parsodan v. Emperor (1925) 12 AIR Rang 69 there was an omission to state the term of restriction as required by the proviso (a) to Section 4, Burma Habitual Offenders Act, so that the defence made no attempt to produce evidence on the question of restriction, although there were several witnesses who were willing to become sureties for good behaviour. In. jagar Singh v. Emperor (1929) 16 AIR Lah 504 the party concerned was prepared to exe-cute the bond and the Magistrate made a defective order under Section 112, Criminal P.C, and only examined one witness. In Ranga Reddi v. Emperor (1920) 7 AIR Mad 534 the importance of giving notice of the information in clear specific terms was stressed for the reason that such information is usually of a confidential nature which the party has no means to know otherwise than from the terms of the preliminary order. In Emperor v. Nihal (1926) 13 AIR All 759 the preliminary order did not contain any more substance of information than that the persons produced before the Magistrate were habitual thieves, burglars and eattle lifters and that they associated with bad characters. That obviously gave them not the slightest intimation as to what were the grounds on which the description of their character was based. The view did not commend itself to the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court as will be evident from. Emperor v. Ram Ghulam (1927) 14 AIR Oudh 806 In that case it has been held that it was sufficient to specify that portion of the clause of Section 110, Criminal P.C, which was applicable to the particular case. In a later case of the Allahabad High Court a Bench of two Judges unhesitatingly accepted this view as correct: Emperor v. Chandan (1930) 17 AIR All 274. In Bhutnath Ghosh v. Emperor (1929) 16 AIR Cal 789 the two learned Judges of the Bench who differed in opinion on the question whether the Magistrate's Order was to be affirmed or not, were unanimous in the view that the words "substance of information' occurring in Section 112, Criminal P.C, did not mean details of the information. They agreed that the expression only meant such information as would enable the party to know under what clause of Section 110, Criminal P.C. he is charged and that it did not contemplate that the order should set out the particulars in the manner of a charge drawn up at a trial. The preponderance of judicial authority is in favour of this view. It must be observed that even in the two Madras cases cited above the learned Judges made it clear that the preliminary order itself would not be illegal and void on account of the omission to mention the necessary particulars but that the final order is liable to be set aside if the defect in the preliminary order appears to have resulted in prejudice to the party affected by it.

(3.) SO Far as the present case is concerned, there is no ground whatever for any grievance on this account. The proceedings were initiated not on any confidential information but on a written complaint which set forth all the facts and circumstances necessitating the preventive action. The Magistrate examined the complainant and recorded his statement before making the preliminary order. The applicant cross-examined the complainant as well as the police reporter at inordinate length and he filed a written statement covering more than eight sheets. In the whole course of the protracted proceeding there is not a trace of any prejudice caused to him. It was unnecessary and altogether impracticable to incorporate in the preliminary order the impugned passages from his speeches. Under Section 108, Criminal P.C, the Magistrate received information that the applicant was a person who orally disseminated matter which was calculated to excite, communal hatred and ill-will. The Magistrate had to decide from the speeches whether or not he was a man of that description. The question whether or not the mischievous consequence apprehended by the complainant would follow from the series of public speeches which he had delivered had to be decided from the general tone and the trend of the speeches as a whole. The applicant himself could not be unaware of the effect of his speeches as understood by the authorities since he had been already twice warned about them.