DATTATRAYA SADASHIV KARVE Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS reference raises questions, the answers to which turn upon the true construction of Section 307, Criminal P.C. Owing to the full and helpful order passed by the learned; referring Judges it does not appear necessary to marshal the very numerous decisions which have been reported. These are all mentioned in the referring order with the exception of Sheoprashad v. Emperor (1938) 25 AIR Nag 394. None of them deals with the first question put. Most of them are concerned with the powers of the Court to which a criminal case is submitted where, after a jury trial, the Judge disagrees with the verdict of the jury. The majority express the view that the Court to which the case is submitted should only reach a conclusion of fact different from that contained in the jury's verdict where that verdict is perverse. The minority suggest or decide that the Court's powers are wider. It is necessary to. treat the first question as raising a point of first impression, for, as we have already observed, the reported cases do not deal with it. This makes it possible to consider the construction of the various Sections involved untrammelled by authority.

(2.) SOME of the eases mentioned in the referring order suggest that certain words in Section 307 are unnecessary. In our view, however, all the words can be given a meaning without doing violence to rules of construction and without denying to the Court powers which it would seem necessary to give to that Court if the purposes of the Act are to be effectively carried out. Section 307 is a Section laying down the procedure to be followed where there has been a trial of a criminal case by a jury and that trial has not resulted in either the conviction or the acquittal of the accused because the jury and the Judge are in disagreement. We understand that every criminal case (save in such exceptional cases as where leave to withdraw is given or a nolle prosequi entered, or the powers to discharge are invoked) must somehow or other end in either a conviction or an acquittal. Normally, in a jury trial, one or other of those results is arrived at by a conjunction of the powers and functions of Judge and jury, the Judge being the guide and arbiter as to matters of law and the jury as to matters of fact. The scheme of the Code however envisages the possibility that a Judge may disagree with a jury's verdict. If he does so Section 307 comes into operation. If he does not do so but accepts the verdict, then not only is the verdict conclusive on matters of fact in that Court so that the Judge must loyally pass sentence or acquit on the basis of the verdict but no Court on appeal may traverse the findings of the jury (Section 418) save within the narrow limits (limits which exclude pure questions of fact) laid down in Section 423(2).

(3.) CONFORMABLY to this scheme we find from Section 307(1) that where (1) the Judge disagrees with the verdict and (2) is clearly of the opinion that it is necessary for the ends of justice to submit 'the' (not 'a') ease, he must submit the case to the High Court. When he so submits the case he must record his opinion and the grounds on which that opinion is based. If the verdict is of acquittal he must state the offence which he thinks the accused has committed. He has certain powers where Section 310 is involved which need not be considered in this analysis. It will thus be seen that two concurrent conditions are necessary before a Judge can submit the case : (1) disagreement between Judge and jury and (2) clear opinion, on the part of the Judge, that to accept the verdict would defeat the ends of justice. We apprehend that the second condition could only arise if, in the opinion of the Judge, the jury had arrived at a perverse verdict. Judges frequently disagree with the conclusions of juries, and sometimes express their disagreement, while at the same time accepting the verdict. It is only when the Judge is not merely in disagreement but is persuaded that it is necessary, in the interests of justice, to refuse to accept the verdict that the question of submission arises.