MT RAHMAT BIBI Vs. LCHANDU LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts, as stated by learned Counsel appearing for the parties, are these. THE opposite party, Lala Chandu Lal, had taken a deed of simple mortgage from the applicants before us. THE property mortgaged was a house. This house stood on nazul land which was not transferable. THE mortgagee, Lala Chandu Lal, brought a suit for sale on foot of his mort. gage and obtained a decree. He applied for the execution of that decree and the execution Court held that all that had been mortgaged to him and all that was covered by the decree obtained by him, and therefore all that could be sold in execution of the decree, was the materials of the house. Ho submitted to that order and applied for leave to bid. Leave was granted to him. His was the last bid for Rs. 4000 and the sale was concluded in his favour. He certified that his decree has been satisfied to the extent of Rs. 4000. He then obtained possession over the property under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Subsequently, he made attempts to persuade the authorities to transfer the nazul land to him, but his request was not granted for the ground that nazul land could not be transferred. We are told that he was then directed to remove the materials of the house. He thereupon filed the application which has given rise to the petition in revision before us. It purported to be under Section 151, Civil P.C., and the prayer was that the Court "may very kindly be pleased to set aside the sale of the material of the house alone.... "It is this application which has been granted by the learned Judge below. We are of opinion that the order cannot be sustained.

(2.) AS already stated the execution Court passed an order holding that the decree permitted the sale of the materials only and the decree-holder submitted to that order. He thereafter applied for permission to bid and purchased the house and certified to the execution Court that his decree had been satisfied to the extent of his bid. The order passed by the execution Court has long since become final. If the decree, holder was dissatisfied with that order, it was open to him to appeal. If he wanted to apply that the sale be set aside, he might have done so, provided he made his application within the time prescribed by law and provided his allegations in the application could bring it within the four corners of the provisions laid down in the Civil Procedure Code in that behalf. The learned Judge has observed that "mean, while the period of limitation within which he might have applied to have the sale set aside had expired." But if he chose to occupy himself in trying to get non-transferable land transferred to him and allowed the time prescribed for making the application to expire, that is his own fault. It has been pointed out over and over again that Section 151 of the Code does not confer an unlimited jurisdiction on the Courts to do what they please. It has further been pointed out that when another remedy was or is open to a party, that party has no right to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. It seems to us that this was a wholly misconceived application and should never have been entertained. We allow this petition in revision, set aside the order passed by the Court below on 11 August 1937 and dismiss the application of the decree-holder, Lala Chandu Lal, filed on 14 May 1937. The petitioners before us shall have their costs of these proceedings in both Courts.