KUNIYIL CHANDU Vs. MATHILEDATH SANKARAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The plaintiff has preferred this appeal against the decree of the Subordinate Judge of South Malabar at Calicut dismissing his suit for redemption and recovery of a paramba with arrears of rent according to the terms of a kana kychit executed on 31 May 1927 by respondent 1 in his favour. It was provided in the kychit marked as Ex. A in the case that if the kanamdar, i.e., respondent 1, kept the rent in arrears or did any act prejudicial to the appellant or if he quarried stones-from the plot without the appellant's written consent thereto respondent 1 should on demand by the appellant, surrender, the plot to him without raising any dispute or any plea with reference to the stipulated, term, of 12 years on receiving the kanam amount the value of the kuzhikur chamayams as estimated then and the fee for the unexpired period of the term. The appellant's case was that respondent 1 quarried stones from the plot in question without his written consent and that he was therefore entitled to demand the surrender of the plot according to the terms of the kychit set out above even before the expiry of the terms fixed. Respondent 1 denied that he quarried any stones from the plot and pleaded inter alia that, in any cases, by virtue of the provisions of the Malabar, Tenancy Act, 24 of 1930, the appellant had no right to recover the property before the expiry of the term. The trial Court found; that respondent 1 did quarry stones from, the paramba contrary to the terms of the kychit, Ex. A and was therefore bound to surrender the plot as stipulated in Ex. A. He accordingly passed a decree for redemption and recovery of the paramba on the plaintiff depositing the kanam and other amounts as provided in the kychit. There was no discussion of the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act invoked by respondent 1 in bar of the suit. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge while confirming the finding of the trial Court as to respondent 1 having quarried stones from the paramba contrary to the terms of the Kychit held that after the enactment of Section 20. Malabar Tenancy Act, a kanamdar could not be evicted except on one of the grounds specified therein, and as no such ground was made out by the appellant his suit failed.

(2.) The learned Counsel for the appellant has conceded before me that none of the grounds specified in Section 20, Malabar Tenancy Act, exists in this case and that no claim, for eviction under that Section can be sustained. But he contends that the kychit Ex. A having been executed long before the Malabar Tenancy Act was passed the appellant's right to evict respondent 1 must be determined with reference to the terms of the kychit and such right cannot be controlled or affected by Section 20 of the Act. I am unable to accept this contention. Section 20 of the Act enacts: No suit for eviction of a customary verumpattamdar, kuzhikanamdar or kanamdar shall lie at the instance of the landlord except on the following grounds, etc.

(3.) It seems to me that the terms of the Section quite clearly prohibit any suit being brought for eviction of a kanamdar except on any of the grounds specified therein quite irrespective of any contract or bargain between the parties and this conclusion is reinforced by an examination of the object underlying the Act and of the provisions of Secs.16, 17, 18 and 22. The Act deliberately sets out: to alter and amend the law relating to landlord and tenant in the District of Malabar to the extent, in the manner and for the purposes hereinafter appearing, and it is clear that it was intended to supersede the customary and contractual rights, liabilities and incidents pertaining to the various forms of land tenure prevailing in the district to the extent to which such rights, liabilities and incidents run counter to the provisions enacted therein. Secs.16, 17 and 18, for example, confer a right of renewal on a customary verumpattamdar, a kanamdar and kuzhikanamdar respectively on the expiry of the veerumpatam, kanam and kuzhikanam as the case may be and specify the renewal fee payable in each case by the tenant. Though there are no words in these Secs.to show that the provisions are intended to control and override bargains between the parties, the terms of Section 22(1) make it clear that that was the intention of the Legislature. To my mind, the opening words of Section 22(1), namely "notwithstanding any contract to the contrary, whether made before or after the commencement of the Act," could have more appropriately found place in Secs.16, 17 and 18 as these are the provisions that confer the new rights, while Section 22 only prescribes the procedure for the enforcement of those rights. However that may be, reading these four Secs.together, I am clear that the Legislature intended that stipulations between the parties made either before or after the Act contrary to these provisions should be superseded. Indeed, the appellant's learned Counsel conceded that the respondents would be entitled to have the kanam renewed notwithstanding the terms of Ex. A and the present suit was bound to fail if Section 17 applied to this case, but he urged that it was inapplicable because the paramba in question is a dry land and is excepted as such from the operation of that Section by Clause c(ii) thereof. But apart from the question whether the suit paramba falls within the exception or not, I am referring, in this connexion, to the concession of the appellant's learned Counsel as to the effect of Section 17, to show that, Section 20 being one of the same fasciculus of Secs.must be understood as part of the same scheme of statutory supersession of stipulations between the parties which are inconsistent with those provisions.