(1.) This is a plaintiff's appeal and arises out of a suit brought against the defendant for possession of a house described in the plaint, as the nearest reversioner of Har Narain, the last male owner of the property in dispute. The defendant contended, inter alia, that the plaintiff was not the nearest reversioner of Har Narain and that he had relinquished his reversionary rights under an agreement dated 2 November, 1888. The trial Court found that the plaintiff was the nearest reversioner of Har Narain and the agreement relied on by the defendant was void under Section 6(a), T.P. Act. It decreed the suit. On appeal the learned Civil Judge disposed of the case merely on the ground of the deed of relinquishment dated 2 November, 1888. The learned Civil Judge was of the opinion that the plaintiff was estopped from asserting his claim as reversionary heir. He relied on Nakched Choudhury V/s. Sukhdev Choudhuri and Raghubir Dutt v. Narain Dutt , Annada Mohan Roy V/s. Gour Mohan Mallick (1921) 8 A.I.R. Cal. 501 and Wazan Singh V/s. Ratan Singh (1921) 8 A.I.R. Cal. 105. He refused to follow Dayaram Premji V/s. Bechar Das (1922) 9 A.I.R. Bom. 437. Mohammad Hashmat Ali V/s. Kaniz Fatima (1915) 2 A.I.R. All. 486, is a Division Bench case and is in point. There it was decided: There is nothing illegal in a person, for good consideration, contracting not to claim in the event of his becoming entitled to inherit on the decease of a living person.
(2.) Its correctness was doubted by Piggott, J, in Chabli V/s. Parmal (1919) 6 A.I.R. All. 371 who observed: The learned District Judge has found that the agreement of 3 June 1897, "if legal is binding on the plaintiff." He quotes the authority of the Bombay High Court, Sums-uddin Goolam Hussain V/s. Abdul Husain Kalim- uddin (1907) 31 Bom. 165, in support of his finding that the agreement in question amounts in effect to the transfer of the chance of succession to an estate, and cannot be enforced against the plaintiff so as to prevent him from claiming property which has devolved upon him under the ordinary Hindu law of inheritance. I have myself referred to a case in which the same view was taken, If the matter were res integra in this Court, I should have preferred to follow that decision, adopting the reasoning of Sir Edward Chamier.
(3.) There is no doubt that a reversioner cannot transfer his right to succeed as reversioner. Section 6(a), T.P. Act, is clear on this point. There are some cases in which it has been held that if a reversioner is a party to a. compromise and has obtained under it some substantial benefit which he has enjoyed, he is estopped from asserting his right when the succession opens. In Kanhai Lal V/s. Brij Lal (1918) 5 A.I.R. P.C. 70, their Lordships of the Privy Council observed at p. 495: There is no question here of a conveyance of, or of an agreement to convey, any future right or expectancy, or of an agreement to relinquish any future right or expectancy. The question here is whether Lala Kanhai Lal did not by his acts in 1892 debar himself from now claiming as reversioner.