LAWS(PVC)-1929-2-185

MANSA TEWARI Vs. PARMESHAR TEWARI

Decided On February 04, 1929
MANSA TEWARI Appellant
V/S
PARMESHAR TEWARI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a second appeal by the defendants. The plaintiffs among whom are people, who were originally made pro forma defendants, brought the suit, out of which this appeal has arisen, for a declaration of their title and for a perpetual injunction. The suit arose out of the following facts: The pedigree given in the plaint will show that one Sheodan Tewari had four sons: Raman Tewari. Meharban Tewari, Sita Ram Tewari, and Diha Ram Tewari. These four sons divided the "birt jajmani" of Sheodan Tewari in four equal shares, that the "gifts" received in three months of the year went to one son and gifts" received in another three months to another son and so on. Diha Ram died and his heirs, according to the pedigree, were his nephews, the sons of Sita Ram. Kishun Dayal Tewari, one of the sons of Sita Ram, claimed to have been adopted by Diha Ram. In that capacity, he claimed the entire "three months" of Diha Ram. It is said that Sita Ram was then alive and he persuaded his sons to settle their dispute. It was settled in this way that in every month Kishun Dayal was allowed to share the gifts made in 24 days and the other sons of Sita Ram were allowed to take the gifts made on six other days, in the course of a month. It is to be understood that this division was as to the three months belonging to Diha Ram. The plaintiffs who were some of the sons of Sita Ram and descendants of others, brought the suit on the allegation that Kishun Dayal's sons were interfering with the six days which were allowed to the plaintiffs. The defence set up was that Kishun Dayal was entitled to those six daysalso and not only to the 24 days as admitted, as the proper share of Kishun Dayal, by the plaintiffs. The Courts below have found that the plaintiffs case was true and they have agreed in decreeing the suit.

(2.) In this Court, only one point has been urged by the learned Counsel for the appellants and it is this. In the circumstances of the case, the relief of perpetual injunction was not proper. The appellant's point is that a perpetual injunction cannot be granted where pecuniary compensation would afford an adequate relief. The argument is that if and when the defendants receive any gifts, which, ordinarily, ought to go to the plaintiffs the plaintiffs remedy would be to bring a Suit for recovery of that gift. The learned Counsel had to go so far as to admit that this might mean that at the end of every month the plaintiffs would have to institute a suit or they might let their reliefs accumulate and they might bring their suit once at the end of the year. This is a proposition of law which, in our opinion has only to be mentioned to be rejected. One of the grounds on which the perpetual injunction can be granted is mentioned in Clause (c), Section 54, Specific Relief Act. It is: where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceeding.

(3.) If the learned Counsel's argument is correct, as we have already stated, there would be an endless litigation between the parties to the suit. Therefore, a perpetual injunction is the only adequate relief.