GULABCHAND Vs. GULABCHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE respondent Chunnilal brought a suit against the appellant Gulabchand, his mother Mt. Goridulaiya and a third party Khalaksingh upon a bond, executed by the appellant Gulabchand, and on previous accounts. The trial Court passed a decree for the claim against the appellant only, discharging the other two defendants. An appeal preferred by Gulabchand was dismissed by the District Judge and he now appeals to this Court. The facts of the case are for the most part admitted, and the only question to be decided in the appeal is whether the appellant is estopped from pleading minority as a defence to the claim, as he had represented himself to be of full age when he signed the bond in suit.

(2.) THE dealings between the parties began in July 1918 and continued up till 1920. All these dealings were effected by the mother Mt. Goridulaiya as guardian of her son Gulabchand, and it is alleged that Khalaksingh, who was her agent, also took part in the transactions. In August 1922 the accounts between the parties were made up and then the bond in suit (Ex. P. l), dated 7th August 1922, was executed by Gulabchand in his own name for the amount due on the previous bonds and pledges and for a further sum of Rs. 214-3-6 taken in cash, the total coming to Rs. 1,575. The respondent alleged that Gulabchand and the other defendants represented to him that Gulabchand had attained majority and was looking after his own business and therefore he had the bond executed by Gulabchand in his own name and not by his guardian. Gulabchand denied any such representation on his part, but both the Courts below have hold that the representation was made and that on that representation the respondent took the bond from Gulabchand. As regards Gulabchand's minority it is to be noted that it has been proved that he was born on 20th April 1903 and therefore was over 19 years at the time the bond was executed. His estate, however, had been taken under management under the Guardian and Wards Act and Goridulaiya had been appointed guardian of the property and person of the minor by the District Judge on 1st April 1910. The minor was not discharged until 21st November 1923 when the District Judge found that he appeared to be 21 years of age and capable of managing his affairs Under Section 3, Indian Majority Act, the ordinary age of majority is 18 years, but in the case of a person for whom a guardian has been appointed under the Guardian and Wards Act the age of majority is 21 years. It appears then that Gulabchand had not even attained the age of 21 when he was discharged by the District Judge, and that he was only 19 and was still a ward under the Act when he executed the bond in suit. There can be no doubt then that he was a minor at the time the bond was executed, and this has been found by both the Courts below.

(3.) THE first point to be borne in mind is that there is a published ruling of this Court in Mt. Muliabai v. Garud [1919] 15 N.L.R. 149 in which the view has been expressed, following the decisions in Mahommed Syedol Ariffin v. Yeoh Ooi Gark A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 242 and R. Leslie, Ltd. v. Shiell [1914] 3 K.B. 607, that an infant who had obtained money by falsely representing his age would not be liable on a contract, nor would he be liable for money had and received. The lower appellate Court has referred to this ruling in para. 13 of its judgment and has brushed it aside somewhat hastily on the ground that the discussion of the point of estoppel in the case really only amounted to obter dicta. I would draw the attention of the learned District Judge to the fact that ha is bound to follow the published rulings of this Court and may not set up his own opinion in the matter or follow the rulings of other High Courts, which express a contrary view. I would also differ from the view expressed by the District Judge that the discussion of the question of the estoppel Under Section 115, Evidence Act, was in any sense an obiter dictum in the case referred to. In that case, as in the present case, the question of estoppel had been directly pleaded; and, though as a matter of fact, the finding of the lower appellate Court there was that the minor had not falsely represented himself to be of age, misrepresentation had been distinctly pleaded and was again urged In second appeal. I would therefore strictly draw the attention of the District Judge to the published ruling and to the obligation, under which he rests, of following such rulings in future.