EMPEROR Vs. BHALCHANDRA TRIMBAK RANADIVE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the two accused are members of the managing committee of the Girni Kamgar Union, Accused No. 2 is also a secretary of the Union and the editor of the newspaper Kranti, which is the organ of the Girni Kamgar Union, On July 12, 1929, the Commissioner of Police issued a notification, Ex. A, under Sub-section (3) of Section 23 of the City of Bombay Police Act IV of 1902 prohibiting the president, the secretary, the members of the managing committee, and the members of the Girni Kamgar Union, from holding, convening or calling together any assembly of mill hands or employees of the Textile mills of Bombay for one week from the date of the order. The notification was duly published in the mill area in the evening of the 12th. On July 13 in the morning Superintendent Mr. Spiers got a copy of the hand-bill, Ex. C, purporting to be signed by six persons including the accused inviting the strikers to attend the meeting for women Article 3 p. m. and for men at 5 p. m. and directing that the meeting should not be stopped even if the police or anybody else made any illegal attempts to break the meeting, and the work of the meeting should be carried on even if any arrests were made. Mr. Spiers went to the Kumbhar Chawl at about 3-30 p. m. with the Chief Presidency Magistrate and the Commissioner of Police. A number of people were collected in the open space between the Chawla The Commissioner of Police, Mr. Kelly, asked both the accused whether they had convened the meeting and both of them admitted that they had convened the meeting. The Commissioner then told them that the meeting was illegal and in contravention of the order issued by him. They said they had taken the best legal advice as regards the order and considered it illegal. Mr. Dastur, the Chief Presidency Magistrate, then intervened and informed them that as long as they did not get a decision from the Court they were defying the order by holding the meeting, and that the police were determined to disperse the meeting if they did not disperse themselves. The Chief Presidency Magistrate suggested that the proper course for them would be to get themselves arrested and get the case decided in Court. The accused after some hesitation agreed to the suggestion of Mr. Dastur, They were then arrested under the orders of the Chief Presidency Magistrate. Accused No. 1 then addressed the meeting and informed the Commissioner that he had advised the members to disperse and not to hold any meeting till the case was decided. The audience dispersed and both the accused were released on their own recognizances. The accused were placed before the Presidency Magistrate, fifth Court, Mr. Jungalwala, and tried for an offence under Section 143 of the Indian Penal Code of being members of an unlawful assembly, The learned Magistrate, after considering the whole evidence, convicted the accused under Section 143, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced them to six weeks rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 200 each.

(2.) It is urged on behalf of the accused that assuming that the common object of the assembly was unlawful on the ground that it was to commit an offence under Section 127 of the Bombay Act IV of 1902 of breach or disobedience of an order of the Commissioner, under Section 23, Sub-section (3), the offence under Section 188 was not referred to in the charge. The present is a summons case and under Section 242 of the Criminal Procedure Code it is not necessary to frame a charge. The trend of the examination and cross-examination of the witnesses on behalf of the prosecution clearly shows that the common object of the assembly alleged against the accused was an offence under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Spiers in his evidence stated that he had attended meetings held by the strikers and the burden of the speeches was: "Don t go to work, don t let others go to work "; and the result was, obstruction, annoyance, and serious injury to workmen going to work in the mill area as well as on other work, and this resulted in danger to life and human safety, e. g., the safety of the shop-keepers and others.

(3.) It is urged on behalf of the accused that the order passed by the Commissioner of Police under Section 23, Sub-section (3), was not an order promulgated by a public servant lawfully empowered to promulgate such order within the meaning of Section 188, and that any assembly or procession referred to in Sub-section (3) of Section 23 referred to an assembly in a public street or place where the public have a right to go, and reliance is placed on Sub-section (1) of Section 28 where the processions and assemblies in public streets are referred to. The words "any assembly or procession" are very wide and are not restricted to an assembly or procession in a public place or street. Though processions and assemblies in streets are referred to in Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23, there is no limitation placed on "any assembly or procession" in Sub-section (3) of Section 23. Section 23, Sub-section (1), Clause (f), refers to a nuisance in any place including a private place, and gives the Commissioner power to summarily stop the nuisance caused by the continuance of music or other such sounds on account of the serious illness of, or because it seriously interferes with the reasonable occupation of, any person resident or lawfully engaged in the neighbourhood. Similarly, Sec. 23, Sub-section (2), Clause (e), would include anything, prohibited by the clause, being done in a private place. Section 24, Sub- section (1), gives the Commissioner of Police power to temporarily close or take possession of any building or place and to exclude all or any persons therefrom in certain contingencies, Section 26, Sub-section (1), may also in certain cases refer to the exercise of the power of the Commissioner in a private place. The special orders prescribed by Chapter III of the Police Act are not confined to public streets or places. It is urged on behalf of the Crown that the place where the meeting was held was an open space between two chawls and fell within the definition of a "street" in Section 8, Clause (i), of the Bombay Act IV of 1902. But Mr. Spiers has admitted in cross-examination that the place where the meeting was held was a private place. It is urged on behalf of the accused that Section 23 was taken from the Madras Act which referred to an assembly in a public place. We have to construe the words as they appear in the section, and think that the words used in Sub-section (3) of Section 23 are wide enough to include an assembly at the place where the meeting was held on July 13, 1929, It is a question for the Legislature to consider whether the Commissioner of Police should have the power to prohibit any assembly or procession, whether in a public or a private place.