P. P. DEO Vs. NARAYAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) MACNAIR , Offg, J.C. 1. The plaintiff, Narayan is a broker who acts as an intermediary between merchants who purchase cloth and Topiwalas who sell cloth. The learned District Judge has described the prevalent practice as follows: The merchants or prospective buyers arrive at a place and desire to buy cloth. They then approach a dalal who collects the Topiwalas or the middle men, who had obtained! cloth from the weavers, and the parties meet The buyers then see the various specimens of cloth and purchase them, but they do not actually purchase direct from the Topiwalas but through the dalals or brokers, who charge 1 per cent. commission on the transactions and arrange for delivery to the buyers. The prices are apparently fixed in consultation, but if the buyer himself is not present it is admitted on both sides that the price is fixed by the broker. There is no enhancement of price between the buyer and the seller, the broker's commission being a fixed percentage. The buyers have an account with the broker and so do the sellers.

(2.) THE plaintiffs have filed the present suit to recover from a merchant the price of cloth which he had purchased for him and delivered to him in this manner together with interest on that price. The defence which I have to consider was that the plaintiff, Narayan was a mere broker and had no right to bring the suit.

(3.) IN appeal it is urged that since the buyers and sellers came face to face the name of the principal was thereby disclosed. The plaintiff Narayan clearly dealt with the defendant in the capacity of an agent for the seller; in my opinion, when he brought his principal face to face with the defendant, it cannot be said that he did not disclose the name of his principal. But Section 230, Contract Act, merely says that a presumption arises when the agent does not disclose the name of the principal. If no such presumption arises, the question remains whether or not facts exist to justify an inference that there was a contract allowing the agent to sue personally. I have to consider what was the intention of the parties when the transaction to which this appeal relates took place. The facts proved and admitted clearly justify the inference that the parties did intend that the agent should recover the price of the cloth. It is admitted that the appellant has kept no record of the names of the principals; he has made payments to the respondent and his account books show such payments as made to respondent 1. It can be safely inferred that it was a term, explicit or implied, of the contract that the appellant should make payments to the respondent.