SECY OF STATE Vs. TSMURUGESAN PILLAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiffs (respondents 1 to 3) for an injunction restraining defendant 1, the Secretary of State for India in Council, from acquiring the plaint-mentioned lands under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The suit was instituted before the issue of any notification by the Government under Section 6 (1), Land Acquisition Act. But, as a matter of fact, such a notification was issued by the Government in respect of the plaint-lands soon after the filing of the suit. That is clear from Ex. 1 which is dated 15 May 1923. The trial Court took into consideration the fact of the issue of the notification, Ex. 1, during the pendency of this suit and held that there was no valid ground for the issue of an injunction restraining the Government from proceeding with the acquisition under the Act. But the lower appellate Court was of opinion, that the suit should be decided on the state of circumstances which existed at the date of the institution, without taking into consideration what transpired subsequent to the filing of the plaint. Considering the scope of this suit within this narrow compass, it held that the civil Court could go into the question, whether the acquisition was really for a public purpose or not, conceding at the same time that, if a notification under Section 6 (1), Land Acquisition Act, be issued and proceedings are taken on that basis, it may be conclusive evidence of the purpose being a public one. Regardless of the declaration contained in the notification, the learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion upon the materials furnished in the suit, that the purpose could not be deemed to be a public purpose. In this view, an injunction was issued against defendant 1 as prayed for in the plaint.

(2.) In this second appeal, it has been fairly conceded by the learned advocate for the respondents that, if a declaration under Section 6, Land Acquisition Act, be made by a notification in the gazette it would be conclusive evidence of the fact that the land sought to be acquired was needed for a public purpose. It has also been held in Ponnaiya V/s. Secy. of State A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1099 that after such a declaration, it is not open to the owner to contend in any civil Court that the land was not needed for public purpose: vide also decision in Veeraraghavachariar V/s. Secy. of State A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 837. as to the conclusiveness of the declaration as to the purpose being a public one. That being so, the next question is, whether in deciding this suit, the Court can take into consideration the fact of the issue of such a notification by the Government soon after the filing of the suit as evidenced by Ex. 1. There is no doubt that the Government would take further steps in the matter of the acquisition on the strength of that notification. The relief claimed by the plaintiffs in this case, is an injunction to restrain the Government from proceeding with the acquisition. If an injunction should be granted ignoring the fact of the issue of this notification, it would only lead to an anomaly and also to multiplicity of suits.

(3.) The decision in Nuri Miah V/s. Ambica Singh [1917] 44 Cal. 47 relied on by the learned Government Pleader, lays down the principles which should be applied to a case of this kind. It is therein laid down that, though ordinarily the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stood at the date of the institution of the suit, that rule need not be followed where it is shown, that the original relief claimed, has, by reason of the subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate, or that it is necessary to have the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. Adopting the principles enunciated in this ruling, it would be proper in this case for the Court to take notice of the fact of the issue of the notification, Ex. 1, though it was after the filing of the suit, in order to mould the decree in the proper form according to the circumstances which have arisen since the institution of the suit. The relief in this case being an injunction which is in the discretion of the Court to grant or refuse, I think that, for a satisfactory disposal of the case, due weight should be given to the issue of the notification, Ex. 1, in order to see whether, in spite of such a notification there are still reasonable grounds for the issue of any injunction. In the view I have taken, it must be held that the notification is conclusive evidence of the fact that the acquisition in question was for a public purpose. It is unnecessary therefore to canvass the evidence in order to come to an independent conclusion whether it is for a public purpose or not.