CHOCKALINGA CHETTY Vs. KOLAGIRI MUNIGAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In these second appeals, it is contended that the finding of the lower Courts that the suit lands constituted a jagir is incorrect. This would appear to be primarily a finding of fact but it has very frequently been contended in this Court that when a finding of fact is based upon the construction of documents, that necessarily implies a further question of law. I am not saying that in this present case the argument has been put forward in that broad form but it has been so put forward before me very frequently. That it is thoroughly untenable is clear from the judgment of the Privy Council in Midnapur Zamindari Co. Ltd V/s. Umacharan Mandal A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 187, where a finding which was based on documentary evidence alone was held to be a decision upon a question of fact, with which the Court could not interfere in second appeal. Their Lordships remark: It is clear therefore, that, unless it can be shown that he (namely the District Judge) has misdirected himself in point of law in dealing with this question of fact upon this evidence there is no ground for appealing from his decision upon the question of fact. and again: The suggestion is that it can be made to appear clearly from the construction of the documents prior to the ruffinama, that the present tenure can be dated earlier than the 6 March 1884. That appears to their Lordships to be nothing but a contention that a different conclusion of fact might have been drawn from those documents,

(2.) In the present case, the District Judge has considered the various documents beginning from the year 1761 and has come to the conclusion that the suit land is a jagir and therefore that it comes within the provisions of Section 3(2)(c), Estates Land Act which relates to unsettled palaiyams or jagirs, There is no definition of the term "jagir" in the Estates Land Act or, so far as I know, in any other legislative enactment and therefore we are thrown back upon what are looked upon as authorities on the subject such as Willson's Glossary, Baden Powell's Land Tenures" and Maclean's "Manual of Administration" and the definitions given in these authorities have been considered by a Bench of this Court in Sam V/s. Somalinga Mudaliar [1917] 40 Mad. 664 and the definition of "jagir" has been there laid down. The District Judge has considered all these definitions and has considered whether the facts in the present case bring the suit estate within the definition of jagir."

(3.) It is argued that the word "jagir" in Sec. 3 (2)(c) must be interpreted as referring only to one class of jagirs and not to another class of jagirs. I can see no ground whatever for saying that there are two classes of jagirs. The Act deals with jagirs and jagirs alone. It is possible that lands may be called jagirs at times which are not really jagirs but we have to see what the word means. The District Judge has accepted the interpretation of the word by this Court and, after a consideration of the documents, has come to the conclusion that the suit estate comes within the definition.