LAWS(PVC)-1929-5-55

DODEY RAM Vs. MTGULKANDO

Decided On May 01, 1929
DODEY RAM Appellant
V/S
MTGULKANDO Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE defendant purchased the property in suit at auction sale in execution of Government dues while a suit by a mortgagee for sale of the property on foot of a prior mortgage was pending. THE suit by Banwari Lal was filed in 1921, and a preliminary decree on a compromise was passed on 10 March 1921. THE defendant purchased on 31 August 1921 and took possession. THE defendant was not a party to the suit for sale brought by Banwari Lal. That suit proceeded without the defendant being a party, and finally the property in suit was purchased by the plaintiff in execution of a final decree for sale on 11 April 1923. THE lower appellate Court has held that the doctrine of lis pendens applied, and that the defendant having purchased during the pendency of the suit for sale was bound by the proceedings in that suit and the final purchase by the plaintiff. He further held that the defendant had no longer any right of redemption left.

(2.) THE circumstances of this case are entirely covered by a Bench Ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Har Shankar Prasad Singh V/s. Shew Gobind Shaw [1899] 26 Cal. 966. It is a ruling of 1899 and has been consistently followed. THE doctrine of lis pendens applies both to voluntary land involuntary sales. It was so held by the Patna High Court also in 1922 in Mathura Prasad V/s. Dasai A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 542. THE Calcutta case is further applicable in barring the right of the defendant to redeem. It was held there that the defendants having purchased a share of an estate at a revenue sale acquired it subject to the mortgage which they were bound in law to discharge before the sale in execution of the mortgage decree had actually taken place, or before, at any rate, that sale had been confirmed; and that having failed to do so, and there being no equities to the contrary, the right of redemption was extinguished. It was argued here that the law would be differently applied as the defendant had no notice of the pending suit for sale and of the auction sale in favour of the plaintiff. Section 52, T.P. Act, however, does not confine the doctrine of lis pendens to cases where the party has notice of the pending suit. THE doctrine is stated in general terms, and those who deal with properties covered by a contentious suit or proceeding have to abide by the result of that suit whether they are aware of the pendency of the suit or not. I dismiss this appeal with costs.