RALLI BROTHERS Vs. PERUMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts in this case are fortunately not in dispute and are stated in the order of the Commissioner. I can shortly summarise them as follows:--The applicant, the injured workman, who, it is agreed for the purposes of this case, is to be treated as being in the employment of Messrs. Ralli Brothers, the appellants before us, was employed in a warehouse which was within the premises of the Port Trust and leased by that body to Messrs. Ralli Brothers. The godown was about a quarter of a mile away from the wharf alongside which steamers are moored. Into that godown were stored various goods, the property of Messrs. Ralli Brothers, some awaiting shipment to Europe and some ready to be entrained at the neighbouring railway station to be conveyed to various destinations in British India. The injuries to the workman were caused by a bale of cotton being lowered from the upper floor of the godown by a crane to the lower floor in which he was waiting to receive it. Owing to negligent handling of the crane the bale was lowered on to his leg and caused the injury, for which he now seeks compensation. That bale was in fact destined to be put on board a ship lying alongside the quay in the harbour to be conveyed by that ship to Europe. In the ordinary course the applicant on receiving that bale would have taken it out of the slings of the crane, handed it over to cartmen who would have put it on their hand cart, taken it to the quayside, a quarter of a mile away and then have handed it over to a gang of stevedores on the quay whose duty it was to put it into the slings of the ship's crane or the Port Trust crane to be slung aboard the ship and stowed in the hold.

(2.) The question that arises under the Indian Act (VIII of 1923) is whether this applicant is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(1)(n) of the Act read with its second schedule. It is not questioned that, if he was a workman within the meaning of the Act, the acts which caused him injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. The material words are to be found in Schedule II (5): Employed for the purpose of loading, unloading or coaling any ship at any pier, jetty, lauding place, wharf, quay, dock, warehouse or shed, on, in or at which mechanical power is used.

(3.) Mechanical power was clearly used in lowering this bale from the upper to the lower floor of the warehouse and therefore the only question we have to consider is whether this man was employed for the purpose of loading a ship. If the words in Schedule II "at any pier, jetty" and so forth refer only to "ship" and do not relate back to the word "employed," the decision must clearly be against the workman, because the ship was not "at" the warehouse in which he worked which was a quarter of a mile away from the ship; and if that be the true construction of this not very clearly drafted section, there is no more to be said and his case must fail because the schedule in that event would relate only to warehouses which are in such a position that goods could be directly slung from them straight on board the ship waiting at the quayside. The Commissioner has adopted another construction of the section of the schedule and has related the words "at any pier," "jetty" and so forth hack to the word "employed." I would only say in passing that it seems to be inapt language to describe a man as being employed "at" and not "in" a warehouse or shed. But I think it is advisable that we should deal with the matter on broader lines and consider whether this man can be said within the meaning of the Act to have been employed "for the purpose" of loading a ship. It is obvious that on any view of this case a line must be drawn somewhere. This particular bale of cotton came from Tinnevelly whence it was consigned by rail to Messrs. Ralli Brothers in Madras to be stored in a godown and ultimately to be put on board a steamer bound for Europe. No one, I think, would contend that a workman who handled the goods in a warehouse in Tinnevelly could reasonably be said to be employed for the purpose of loading a steamer in Madras. The line must be drawn somewhere and I think that in English cases the principle can be found as to where it is to be drawn. It may be true, as was said by the earned Counsel who appeared for the workman, that the trend of the highest authorities in England in interpreting the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906 is to give a broad interpretation to the statute in the direction of favour to the workman. But there is this difference between the English and the Indian Statute that, whereas the former applies to all workmen, the latter only applies to certain defined classes of workmen and casts upon us, in my opinion, the duty of defining those classes with such precision as is possible. We are not without guidance in English cases of high authority as to what point is to be taken as that at which the process of loading begins. It has been said by both sides in turn that those cases are not direct authorities because they are cases relating not to any question of workmen's compensation but to the respective liability of shipper and charterer. I do not see any reason on that account to deprive myself of their guidance in determining the question when it is to be said that the process of loading begins.